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PROBLEMS IN SEARCH OF PRINCIPLES: THE
FIRST AMENDMENT IN THE SUPREME COURT
FROM 1791-1930
by
Howard Owen Hunter*
I. INTRODUCTION
During the past decade scholars have published a tremendous
number of articles on the first amendment. Yet with all that has
been written about the freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and
religion, there remains an urge to read more and to write more.
The process seems almost as important as the subject. Sherwood
Anderson once wrote a letter to William Faulkner in which he said
that all America asks is,
to look at it and listen to it and understand it if you can. Only
the understanding ain't important either: the important thing
is to believe in it even if you don't understand it, and then try
to tell it, put it down. It won't ever be quite right, but there's
always next time; there's always more ink and paper.1
The first amendment is at the core of America, and this essay is
the beginning of an attempt to understand the meaning of it or at
least to tell the story of it even if it never gets "quite right."
The purpose of this article is to try to reach some understanding
of the methodologies and justificatory theories employed by jus-
tices of the United States Supreme Court in deciding free speech
cases. This study may have the additional benefit of providing
some information about the Court's methodological approaches to
constitutional adjudication in general. The focus is limited to the
Supreme Court for several reasons. The Supreme Court is one of
the principal guardians of first amendment values.2 There is no
* Professor of Law, Emory University. B.A. 1968, J.D. 1971, Yale University. The re-
search for this article was supported, in part, by a grant from the Emory University School
of Law.
, Quoted in M. KONVITZ, FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTIES OF A FREE PEOPLE viii (1957).
2 See, e.g., Bollinger, Free Speech and Intellectual Values, 92 YALE L. J. 438 (1983);
Nagel, How Useful Is Judicial Review in Free Speech Cases?, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 302
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doubt that the articulation of rationales for the protection of vari-
ous categories of speech by members of the Court has had a great
impact on legislators, lower courts, and commentators. Finally,
there is a discrete body of law that can be organized in a reasona-
bly comprehensible manner.3
The most important reason for a study that is directed primarily
at the Court's own work is that much of the scholarship has tended
to skirt the Court's decisions and to develop theories and justifica-
tions that ignore, misconstrue, or only partially employ the Court's
actual opinions. Certainly the Court has not always been consis-
tent, clear, or correct, but it is important to determine what the
Court has actually done and why, if for no other reason than to
clarify criticisms of the Court.
Judicial opinions will not provide a coherent, unified theory of
free speech. Most scholars agree on that point, but they have not
hesitated to attempt to develop unified theories that have their
roots in moral and political philosophy, historical interpretation, or
actual case law. Alexander Meiklejohn worked out a scheme of vir-
tually absolute protection for "political speech" because of its ne-
cessity to the operation of a system of self-government.4 Thomas
Emerson, in his influential work, developed a systematic theory of
"expression" based upon the identification of values served by free
speech.5 Justice Holmes is well-known for his "marketplace of
ideas" approach, which comes from the identification of truth-
seeking as the ultimate value of free speech.6 Holmes' approach
was not new; rather, it was an Americanized version of arguments
earlier made by John Stuart MillJ 7 and John Milton. 8 Others have
been more affirmatively libertarian and have argued that the first
amendment is intended to provide the means for "individual self-
(1984).
' There is a wealth of material in the case law of the various states, but any attempt to
consider those cases would require an article of considerably greater length.
A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960).
'T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970).
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859).
s J. MILTON, AREOPAGITICA, A SPEECH FOR THE LIBERTY OF UNLICENSED PRINTING, To
THE PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND (1644).
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realization"9 or "individual development."' 10 Still others have seen
the first amendment as useful to the development of more genera-
lized theories of constitutional interpretation. There is Justice
Black's literal interpretation of the text of the Constitution,1 as
well as Judge Bork's "strict construction" approach to the "govern-
ment process" school of thought. 2 The list could continue, 3 but
most of these writers have sought to develop a theory and then
apply it to first amendment cases. Despite clashes among the au-
thors, much of this work has contributed significantly to the dia-
logue on liberty and has often infiltrated subsequent judicial
decisions.1
4
This essay is not intended to refute the theoretical work of
others, but is intended to add to the ongoing dialogue by ap-
proaching the issues from a slightly different perspective-that of
an analysis of the rationales of particular cases in an attempt to
derive from them not a unified theory of free expression, but an
approach, partly theoretical and partly methodological, to consti-
tutional interpretation. Such an approach will reflect the continu-
ing tension in American law between the transcendental and the
pragmatic, and between individual and collective interests. The
Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 591 (1982).
Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964
(1978).
" See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293 (1964) (Black, J., concur-
ring); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 267 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting).
2 Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1
(1971); see also BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry into the
Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299 (1978).
" See, e.g., Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L.
REV. 964 (1978); Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 Am. B.
FOUND. RESEARCH J. 521; Bloustein, Why is Freedom of Speech a Problem in Contemporary
America? 13 RUTGERS L.J. 59 (1981); Farber, Content Regulation and the First Amend-
ment: A Revisionist View, 68 GEo. L.J. 727 (1980); Wellington, On Freedom of Expression,
88 YALE L.J. 1105 (1979); Symposium, Freedom of Expression: Theoretical Perspectives, 78
Nw. U. L. REV. 911 (1983).
1 There is little doubt, for instance, that Professor Zechariah Chafee's interpretation
of the Holmes opinion in cases such as Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919), and
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919), influenced the application of those opinions
in cases decided later in the 1920s. Similarly, Meiklejohn's work clearly influenced the rea-
soning of the Court in its landmark libel case, New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964). See Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First
Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1965).
19861
62 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35
work of four other scholars has been especially important in the
development of this essay. Two are historians and two are lawyers:
Professors Levy,15 Berns, 6 Mayton"1 and Rabban. 8
One of the more influential books on first amendment theory
published in the past quarter century was Leonard Levy's Legacy
of Suppression," in which he argued that the framers did not have
any comprehensive theory of free speech or press when they
drafted the Bill of Rights. Indeed, to the extent that theoretical
justification was offered for the first amendment, Levy concluded
that it was essentially a restatement of Blackstone.20 Prior re-
straints were condemned,2' while subsequent punishment met with
approval. Blackstone, the common law, the American colonial as-
semblies and courts, the newly formed states, and the framers all
agreed that subsequent punishment would be available for libelous
utterances, including seditious libel.2 2 There was even considerable
15 L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN
HISTORY (1960).
16 W. BERNS, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1976);
W. BERNS, FREEDOM, VIRTUE & THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1957).
" The contributions of one of my faculty colleagues, Bill Mayton, are ongoing, but his
work that has been of the most benefit in preparing this essay is Seditious Libel and the
Lost Guarantee of a Freedom of Expression, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 91 (1984).
18 Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. CHI. L. REV.
1205 (1983); Rabban, The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J. 514 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Rabban, Forgotten Years].
" Levy recently published EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS (1985), a revised and enlarged
version of LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION. His basic thesis remains the same, but the emphasis on
libertarian strands of thought is greater. For a review, see Rabban, The Ahistorical Histo-
rian: Leonard Levy on Freedom of Expression in Early American History, 37 STAN. L. REV.
795 (1985).
20 See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151.
21 Recently, there has been an upsurge of interest in the prior restraint doctrine. See,
e.g., Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66 MINN. L. REV. 11
(1981); Mayton, Toward a Theory of First Amendment Process: Injunctions of Speech,
Subsequent Punishment, and the Costs of the Prior Restraint Doctrine, 67 CORNELL L. REV.
245 (1982); Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First Amendment
Theory, 70 VA. L. REV. 53 (1984). The Supreme Court's most recent general comments on
the prior restraint doctrine are contained in a decision sustaining the validity of a protective
order that prevented the publication of certain information obtained through pre-trial dis-
covery. Seattle Times v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. - (1984).
2 L. LEVY, supra note 15, at 247-48. For a general discussion of seditious libel from the
sixteenth to the eighteenth century, see Hamburger, The Development of the Law of Sedi-
tious Libel and the Control of the Press, 37 STAN. L. REV. 661 (1985).
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support for the idea that the federal judiciary succeeded to the
common law criminal jurisdiction of the English courts. This view,
however, was eventually denied by the Supreme Court, 3 and
doubts about the existence of the authority were important in the
Federalists' decision to enact the Alien and Sedition Act24 rather
than to rely on the common law for prosecution of seditious libel
cases in the federal courts. All of these attitudes tended to suggest,
according to Levy, that there was no strong libertarian flavor to
the original understanding of the first amendment.
The catalyst for the development of a libertarian theory was, in
Levy's view, the passage of the Alien and Sedition Act in 1798. The
anti-Federalists were faced with a direct political challenge and in
their responses formulated a post-Blackstonian theory of free
speech and a free press which drew from natural rights theories.
Walter Berns, in writing about the same period, was more skeptical
of the motives of the anti-Federalists. In his view, the opposition
to the Alien and Sedition Act was rooted in concerns for state sov-
ereignty and the protection of slavery rather than in any real and
lasting concern for a libertarian theory of speech and press.25
Berns' argument has some credence, but there can be no denial
that there was an outpouring of anti-Federalist letters, essays, arti-
cles, and speeches in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth cen-
turies that contained the seeds of a libertarian theory of speech.26
23 United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 445 (1812). See generally L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-31, at 115 (1978).
24 1 Stat. 596 (1798).
2 Berns agreed with Levy that the arguments made by Madison, St. George Tucker,
and Tunis Wortman in response to the Alien and Sedition Act prepared the basis of a liber-
tarian theory of speech, but he gave them less credit. The driving force behind the Jeffer-
sonians' reaction to the Alien and Sedition Act, in Berns' view, was the concern with states
rights, not individual rights. They did not agree with the Federalists' argument that the
national government could exercise sovereign powers over aliens, because an adoption of
that view implied a national governmental power over the slave trade. Thus slavery and
states' rights were the critical issues. Free speech was a makeweight. See W. BERNS, THE
FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FUTuRE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 80-146 (1976).
26 Even if Jefferson may have been motivated by states rights and even if he subse-
quently expressed an interest in a few selected prosecutions of newspaper editors, his cam-
paign in 1800 clearly provided a wealth of material for the later development of a libertarian
concept of the first amendment.
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Professor William Mayton has recently published an article2 7
that takes issue with Levy's understanding of the original intent.
Mayton argues that the original Constitution-not the first amend-
ment-provided a structural protection for speech that was much
greater than what Levy suggests to have been the framers' under-
standing. In Mayton's view, the Constitution abolished seditious
libel by requiring, in the treason clause,2 8 an overt act as a neces-
sary predicate to a prosecution for treason. Furthermore, the con-
cept of the federal government as one possessed of limited dele-
gated powers, as well as the dispersal of power through federalism,
buttressed the notion that the government had no power to deal
with sedition.3° Mayton concedes that federalism left "the power to
protect person and property from injuries caused by speech" to the
states.3 ' His article does not examine the states' police powers over
political speech and sedition, but concludes that the national gov-
ernment was simply not intended to have such a power. The prob-
lem with the Bill of Rights, according to Mayton, is that its provi-
sions implied a national power to regulate and thereby led to the
development of balancing approaches to speech issues in situations
where no balancing should ever have taken place:
The objective underlying the Bill of Rights was to identify
those personal liberties that were to be protected against oth-
erwise legitimate assertions of government power. This objec-
tive though, is one that invites conflict and compromise in a
contest between individual rights and the collective interests
that government seeks to advance. Consequently, the courts,
in their task of protecting individual rights, have claimed the
discretion to compromise these rights as well as the opposing
217 Mayton, supra note 17.
28 Article III, § 3 of the Constitution states:
Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them,
or, in adhering to their Enemies, giving them aid and comfort. No Person shall be
convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt
Act, or on confession in open Court.
29 Mayton, supra note 17, at 94-95.
20 Id. at 94.
1 Mayton, supra note 17, at 141. Professor Levy, in turn, has criticized Mayton's criti-
cism. See Levy, The LEGAcy Reexamined, 37 STAN. L. REv. 767, 770-792 (1985). At present,
however, Mayton still has the last word. See Mayton, From a Legacy of Suppression to the
Metaphor of the Fourth Estate, to be published in 38 STAN. L. REV.
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governmental interest. In the area of public speech, the result
of this "balancing" has often been tragic. Merely human
judges, while extolling the right to speak, have sacrificed it to
fear, to the passion of majorities, and to base, self-serving
politics. More mundanely, they have compromised speech be-
cause of their own bad guesses about the public interest.32
In a massive work published in 1981, Professor David Rabban
reviewed a wide range of judicial opinions and scholarly comments
from the period prior to World War I. 3 It does a disservice to sum-
marize such a long work in a few sentences, but for the purposes of
this essay, Rabban's principal points were: (1) First amendment
jurisprudence did not begin with the Espionage Act cases decided
by the Supreme Court in 1919. Instead, there was a significant
body of precedent and its impact was felt in the post-war cases. (2)
Federal judicial decisions prior to World War I were "hostile" to
free speech values. (3) The extrajudicial commentators were decid-
edly more liberal than the judges. (4) State court decisions were
more varied. Although they were generally not sympathetic to free
speech concerns, Rabban found some of them to contain seeds of
libertarian theory. (5) The leading post war commentator,
Zechariah Chafee, essentially re-wrote the Holmes and Brandeis
opinions to fit his own free speech theory which had its roots in
pre-war scholarship, and, in turn, Brandeis became particularly in-
fluenced by Chafee's writings.
Rabban's comments on Chafee are especially interesting because
of Professor Chafee's influence on later writings by judges as well
as by scholars. In essence, Rabban argues that Chafee picked up
some threads from Holmes and wove them into his own arguments,
perhaps subconsciously, so that it appeared that Chafee's own po-
sition was shared by Holmes and Brandeis, when, in fact, Holmes
made no theoretical break with the past-merely a break in the
placement of the fulcrum in a balancing test. But Chafee somehow
managed to convince Holmes and Brandeis that what Chafee said
they said was really what they meant to say:
32 Mayton, supra note 17, at 141.
33 Rabban, Forgotten Years, supra note 18.
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As they adopted libertarian values, Holmes and Brandeis
faced the difficult problem of dealing with the prewar judicial
hostility to free speech and its continuation in their own Es-
pionage Act decisions. Trapped in a tradition from which
they wanted to escape, but reluctant to acknowledge that tra-
dition or their own role in it they followed the lead provided
by Chafee's article.34
In a more recent work, Rabban has developed this theme further
and has detailed the impact of Chafee's scholarship on first
amendment case law.35 Although the methodology of the research
for this essay is similar to that employed by Professor Rabban, our
purposes are quite different. His article performed the valuable
service of collecting historical data from an overlooked era and
dusting them off for us all to see. He is certainly correct that the
first amendment did not spring full-bloom from the head of
Holmes sometime in 1919. A tradition was extant in 1919 and it
had a significant impact on all the members of the Court. Rabban
also was correct in noting that the judicial climate was "chilly" at
best for those who spoke or wrote on themes outside the main-
stream of accepted social thought. What I hope to do in these
pages, and in other essays to follow, is to examine how and why the
Supreme Court reached its various decisions on free speech ques-
tions in terms of what the members of the Court actually said.
What have been the justificatory theories put forward by the
Court? What have been the normative values most highly prized
by the Court? What has been the Court's own understanding of
the core meaning of this core provision of the Constitution? When
first confronted with free speech issues, federal judges had virtu-
ally no American legal precedent. They were therefore forced to
rely on vague theories about the purpose of the first amendment
derived from the often contradictory late eighteenth and early
nineteenth century writings of the framers, coupled with some
knowledge of various moral philosophers. Judges have employed
justificatory theories that borrow from natural law, utilitarian, so-
34 Id. at 593.
" Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. CHi. L. REV.
1205 (1983).
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cial contractarian, and pragmatic traditions. Sometimes an opinion
may be riddled with references to inconsistent approaches. In
other instances, writings are taken at face value without under-
standing the context from which they evolved. I seek to identify
themes, theories and approaches that may be useful to an under-
standing of how constitutional adjudication, especially in the free
speech area, works.
In order to be clear, a short definition of terms is necessary. A
surprising number of writers confuse "libertarian" values with
"liberal" values. The two may coincide, but in this discussion the
two must be distinguished. To make discussion as simple as possi-
ble, I shall use the adjective "libertarian" to refer to a theory that
maximizes individual rights and justifies them by reference to "na-
ture" or to the existence of a self."' The libertarian's "rights" are
limited, in the crudest sense, only by the general principle of non-
interference, a sort of obverse golden rule that says I can do or say
what I want so long as I do not interfere with your right to do or
say what you want. Governments exist to aid in identifying inter-
ferences and correcting the balance when it goes awry, but ulti-
mate sovereignty exists in the self.37 What many refer to as "liber-
tarian" theories in speech cases should more properly be
characterized as "liberal." That is, the opinions may reflect great
tolerance for speech, dissent and minority views, but the justifica-
tion for this tolerance inheres in utilitarian, consequentialist, con-
tractarian or pragmatic theories, or is the outgrowth of some col-
lective sense of justice. Speech is tolerated not because the speaker
is exercising a right of his autonomy, but because speech is useful
to society in some way or another. It promotes self-government,
aids the search for truth or operates as a safety valve so that ten-
sions are released before they cause an explosion.
I intend eventually to cover all Supreme Court cases to the pre-
sent, but this essay ends in 1930. Although first amendment cases
were not numerous during the first 140 years, those cases do pro-
" That is, I have a "right" or "liberty" of speech because I have a right to be me, an
autonomous self-determining individual.
37 This definition is extremely crude and hardly captures the subtleties in the work of
rights theorists. The point is simply to illustrate the essence of libertarian thought.
1986]
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vide a useful and necessary prologue to an understanding of the
enormous number of cases decided in the past half-century. Be-
sides, there is a limit to what one can and should try to do in a
single essay. The year 1930 is a good stopping point, for that is
when Charles Evans Hughes returned as Chief Justice and forged a
majority on the Court that fundamentally changed the Court's ap-
proach to first amendment issues. 8
II. THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
This section actually begins in the eighteenth century and ends
in the twentieth, but the spillover is slight. The earliest case in-
volving a free speech issue that appears in the United States Re-
ports is not a federal case at all, but one from the Pennsylvania
courts, Respublica v. Oswald,3 9 decided in 1788. Mr. Oswald was a
newspaper publisher who printed several anonymous articles at-
tacking the character of one Andrew Browne, master of a female
academy in Philadelphia. Browne asked Oswald to identify the au-
thor; he refused, and Browne sued Oswald for libel. While the libel
proceedings were pending, Oswald published an article in which he
questioned whether he would be able to get a fair trial in Pennsyl-
vania because of the prejudices of the legal community against
him. The court found him to be in contempt for casting aspersions
upon judicial integrity.40 He spent a month in jail and paid a small
fine. In this one case there were issues involving the tort of defa-
mation, the protection of confidential sources, the privilege of fair
comment, the relationship of a free press to the protection of the
fair administration of justice, and the scope of the contempt
power. If nothing else the Oswald case illustrates the constancy of
certain problems.
Oswald and the court had strikingly different views about the
meaning of a free press. In Oswald's eyes, the whole concept of
libel was incompatible with liberty of the press. Chief Justice Mc-
Kean of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, by comparison, thought
38 See, e.g., E. HUDON, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN AMERICA 80 (1963).
-- 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 319 (1788).
40 Id. at 326.
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that libel was a particularly odious misfeasance and that press
freedom certainly did not include the right to defame with impu-
nity.41 McKean was also of the opinion that liberty of the press
simply meant freedom from prior censorship:
[T]hey [the Pennsylvania Constitution and Bill of Rights]
give to every citizen a right of investigating the conduct of
those who are entrusted with the public business, and they
effectually preclude any attempt to fetter the press by the in-
stitution of a licenser. The same principles were settled in
England, so far back as the reign of William the third, and
since that time, we all know, there has been the freest ani-
madversion upon the conduct of the ministers of that
nation."
The Oswald opinion supports Levy's view that the concept of
press freedom among the leadership of the young republic was es-
sentially that of Blackstone-freedom from the prior restraint of
an administrative licensor and little more.43 Oswald's own argu-
ment, however, indicates that more libertarian, more individualis-
tic, notions of free speech and press were far from unknown. De-
spite the impact of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,44 Oswald's
own conclusion that libel laws were fundamentally incompatible
with a constitutionally protected free press has never commanded
majority support on the Supreme Court. Justice Black agreed with
Oswald,45 but the modern Court has repeatedly affirmed the valid-
ity of the defamation tort within the constitutional scheme.46 Even
Mayton and Levy, who have different interpretations of the fram-
ers' original intent with respect to speech and press, agree that the
tort of defamation was left to the states through their reserved po-
lice powers.47
1, Id. at 325.
42 Id.
11 L. LEvy, supra note 15, at 213-16.
"4 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
11 Id. at 293 (Black, J., concurring).
46 See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323 (1974).
47 L. LEvY, supra note 15, at 186-88, 200; Mayton, supra note 17, at 125-26 & n.180,
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The Supreme Court did not have an explicit first amendment
case until its 1845 holding that the amendment did not apply to
the states.48 The city of New Orleans fined a Catholic priest fifty
dollars for conducting a funeral at a place other than a mortuary
chapel in violation of a local ordinance. The priest argued that the
ordinance unconstitutionally interfered with the free exercise of re-
ligion in violation of the first amendment. The Court, speaking
through Justice Catron, gave short shrift to his case: "The Consti-
tution makes no provision for protecting the citizens of the respec-
tive States in their religious liberties; this is left to the state consti-
tutions and laws; nor is there any inhibition imposed by the
constitution of the United States in this respect on the States." 9
Although this case has not made much of a mark on American ju-
risprudence it is indicative of the reluctance to consider the first
amendment, or any other amendment for that matter, as a na-
tional charter of individual rights as against all government. Ca-
tron's opinion is inconsistent with a national libertarian theory of
rights, for it would be wholly acceptable under the Catron view for
a state to impose severe limits on press, speech and religious free-
doms. In Catron's view the first amendment was not a statement of
rights, but only a limitation on the power of one government, itself
a government of limited powers. Catron's deference to Louisiana
was consistent with theories of federalism that emphasized state
sovereignty rather than state subordination to central
sovereignty. 50
A religious establishment case did arise during the Marshall
Court days, but the case focused on the interpretation and applica-
tion of the Virginia statutes on religious freedom and not on the
first amendment.51 There was a title controversy concerning lands
held by the Episcopal Church5 2 which had been taken over by the
48 Permoli v. First Municipality of New Orleans, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589 (1845). Although
the facts in the opinion are sketchy, this case appears to have been a classic example of
guild protectionism on the part of morticians in New Orleans.
'9 Id. at 609.
11 Catron's views on Federalism were not surprising, for Catron was a Democrat ap-
pointed by President Van Buren, and in 1845 the Court was dominated by Jackson and Van
Buren appointees.
" Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 (1815).
52 The Episcopal Church, the American branch of the Church of England, was the offi-
[Vol. 35
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state.53 Justice Story's interpretation of Virginia's own law on reli-
gious freedom is of interest in connection with the development of
judicial theories of religious freedom. The Virginia statute, written
in large part by Jefferson 54 and strongly supported by his Virginia
allies, is certainly evidence of what Madison and other Virginians
had in mind during the drafting of the Bill of Rights:
Consistent with the Constitution of Virginia the legislature
could not create or continue a religious establishment which
should have exclusive rights and prerogatives, or compel the
citizens to worship under a stipulated form or discipline, or to
pay taxes to those whose creed they could not conscientiously
believe. But the free exercise of religion cannot be justly
deemed to be restrained by aiding with equal attention the
votaries of every sect to perform their own religious duties, or
by establishing funds for the support of ministers, for public
charities, for the endowment of churches, or for the sepulture
of the dead .... While, therefore, the legislature might ex-
empt the citizens from a compulsive attendance and payment
of taxes in support of any particular sect, it is not perceived
that either public or constitutional principles required the ab-
olition of all religious corporations. 55
In Story's view Virginia could not establish a state church, favor
one sect over another, or compel her citizens to pay taxes that
would support creeds to which they did not adhere. At the same
time, the state could not do away with religion. Moreover, the state
was not prohibited from providing generalized aid to religious or-
ganizations for charitable and similar purposes so long as all de-
cial church of Virginia prior to the passage of that state's laws on religious toleration.
53 The action was one to quiet title. The question was whether earlier Virginia statutes
establishing the right of the Episcopal Church to property owned at the time of the Revolu-
tion were repealed by later Virginia statutes which vested title to church property in the
commonwealth and directed that proceeds from the sale of church property should be deliv-
ered to and managed by the overseer of the poor. The Court held that the later statutes
were unconstitutional to the extent that they operated to divest the church of property
acquired before the Revolution. Terrett, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 52.
1 This statute was one of the three accomplishments that Jefferson considered most
significant in his life. He directed that his epitaph note only that he was the founder of the
University of Virginia, and the draftsman of the Declaration of Independence and the Vir-
ginia statute on religious toleration.
55 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 49.
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nominations received equal treatment. This general approach to
state/church relations has remained fairly constant throughout
American history. Story's analysis of the Virginia constitution dis-
played a sensitivity to both institutional tensions and the demands
of individual conscience. Whether the right of a free conscience
was natural or merely the benefit of a positive law was not ad-
dressed in the Story opinion, but there was a libertarian cast to his
statements about freedom from coerced taxation and freedom to
follow one's own values in religious matters that indicated a con-
cern for the protection of individual rights.
Two other decisions reported prior to the Civil War, White v.
Nicholls5 in 1845 and Philadelphia, W.& B.R.R. v. Quigley57 in
1858, touched upon speech or press issues, but they were of more
consequence for what was left unsaid than for what was actually
decided. In the White case, the Court, speaking through Justice
Daniel, held that a letter to a public official requesting the removal
of another public official was a privileged communication. That de-
cision placed the burden of proving malice on the plaintiff. Be-
cause of the privilege, merely showing publication was insufficient
to infer malice.58 In this limited area the Court established a par-
tial defense for libel defendants. The Quigley case also dealt with
issues of privilege and malice in the context of a report to corpo-
rate stockholders on the conduct of the corporation's officers and
directors. Today both cases would be governed by constitutional
considerations; in the mid-nineteenth century the applicability of
the first amendment to an ordinary defamation action was not a
consideration. Furthermore, there was no real consideration of free
speech as a concept or any reference made to a justificatory norm.
The cases were decided upon simple common law tort principles
with their roots in values of fairness, although the incidental effect
was to expand the scope of permissible speech.
During the Civil War, the federal government imposed stringent
censorship rules on press reports and other public communications
for reasons of national security. The impact of wartime concerns
56 44 U.S. (3 How.) 266 (1845).
57 62 U.S. (21 How.) 202 (1858).
" White, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 291.
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on individual freedoms of speech and the press has been well
chronicled elsewhere.59 Although the restrictions were great, few
would deny that the times were difficult. After the war some of the
special laws passed to limit the participation of Confederate lead-
ers and sympathizers in the government of the southern states
gave rise to cases involving speech issues. What is again remarka-
ble about these cases is the absence of any concern with the first
amendment or with any theory of individual speech rights.
Cummings v. Missouri, ° an 1867 decision, was replete with is-
sues that would today require extensive consideration of first
amendment issues because of the subsequent incorporation of the
first amendment though the fourteenth amendment. Missouri
passed a law requiring persons who sought to hold public office or
to practice certain callings or professions, including anyone who
was a "bishop, priest, deacon, minister, elder, or other clergy-
man," 61 to take a "test oath. ' 62 The oath was extremely broad and
was directed toward past, present, and future sympathies with re-
spect to the government. Cummings, a Roman Catholic priest, re-
fused to take the oath. What was at issue, therefore, was a limita-
tion on the performance of priestly functions based on the priest's
personal views, past, present, and future, about a particular secular
government. Apart from the oath there was the question whether
the state had any business licensing or regulating priests and other
religious persons at all. The Court in 1867, however, failed even to
mention the religious freedom issue, even though an attorney for
Missouri reiterated that religious freedom was a matter for state
law.6 3 The Court said that nothing in the Constitution prohibited a
state from establishing a religion or from requiring priests to be
licensed, for the first amendment only restrained the federal gov-
ernment. Fortunately for Father Cummings, the Missouri statute
was held to be a bill of attainder and an ex post facto law prohib-
59 See generally Hall, Free Speech in War Time, 21 COLUM. L. REV. 526 (1921) (cir-
cumstances may affect right of free speech, especially circumstances attending wartime).
" 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867).
6, Id. at 317.
62 Id. at 316.
11 Id. at 294 (argument of G.P. Strong for the state).
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ited by Article I, § 9 of the Constitution.64
During the same term the Court decided a case involving the
constitutionality of a federal law requiring lawyers to take loyalty
oaths.6 In this particular case there was the additional question of
the effect of a presidential pardon-did that clear the applicant's
background so that no oath was necessary? Relying on Cummings,
the Court held the loyalty oath statute to be unconstitutional as a
bill of attainder and ex post facto law under Article I, § 9Me The
Court also held that the President has the power to pardon all fed-
eral offenses (except those resulting in impeachment) and that
Congress is without power to limit the effect of a Presidential par-
don. The first amendment did not merit a mention in the majority
opinion, even though this was a case involving the application of a
federal law.67
What these two cases reveal is that even in a purely federal ac-
tion the first amendment was an unconsidered appendage, and
that even after the Civil War the concept of state sovereignty free
from the impact of the individual rights provisions of the federal
Constitution still had sway. The concept of individual rights in
speech and press as part of a natural heritage of liberty was virtu-
ally unknown in the Court. The protections afforded these litigants
were explicitly based on the text of the Constitution and not on
libertarian theories.
The state/federal dichotomy was developed further in United
States v. Cruikshank,8 decided in 1875. An indictment had been
issued under the Enforcement Act of 187069 charging a conspiracy
" Id. at 325, 327.
5 Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867).
e' Id. at 381.
e The dissenters were at least aware of the amendment's existence. They agreed that
the religious freedom argument in Cummings was inapposite because Constitutional rights
were protected only against the national government. The federal courts could not intervene
except in egregious cases pursuant to their general equity powers. The dissenters noted that
Cummings did not begin to cry out for equitable intervention nearly so much as the Permoli
case, and the Court had not intervened in Permoli. Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 397-99
(Miller, J. dissenting). Justices Swayne, Davis, and Chief Justice Chase joined the dissent.
68 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
69 The modern version of the statute is 18 U.S.C. § 241 (19..).
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to interfere with the rights of peaceable assembly for a lawful pur-
pose, the right to bear arms, the rights of due process and equal
protection, and the right to vote. The Court dismissed the indict-
ments as failing to show an intent by conspiracy to hinder the en-
joyment of any right secured by the Constitution, but the rationale
was of particular interest. Chief Justice Waite, writing for the
Court, concluded that the first amendment protected the federal
right to assemble for the purpose of petitioning Congress for a re-
dress of grievances, but that the Constitution granted no general
right of assembly. The protection of such a right, if it existed at all,
rested solely within the discretion of the several states. To this
point, Waite was simply being consistent with the general states'
rights approach to federalism, although with the ratification of the
fourteenth amendment he had to agree that some limitations were
imposed on state action. Yet he included one other intriguing
comment.
Article IV, § 4 of the Constitution 0 guarantees a republican
form of government for the various states. Implied in the concept
of republican government, according to Waite, was a right of citi-
zens to assemble for the purpose of petitioning the government for
a redress of grievances. Thus Waite seemed to be suggesting that
some individual rights might fairly be implied to exist by virtue of
the actual form of government regardless of the existence or not of
a statutory or constitutional protection. As murky as the opinion
may be, it did provide a hint of some movement toward a more
expansive view of rights than one limited to the particulars of spe-
cific laws or constitutional provisions. The justification, however,
was structural and not libertarian. If there existed a right to as-
semble, it was based on the structure of government created by the
Constitution and not on any individual right separate and apart
from the text of the organizing documents.
70 Article IV, § 4 states:
The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form
of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Applica-
tion of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be con-
vened) against domestic Violence.
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Three years later, in Ex parte Jackson,7 1 the Court actually dis-
cussed the first amendment, albeit by way of dictum. At issue was
a federal prohibition on the use of the mails for the transmittal of
lottery circulars. The Court upheld the prohibition as a proper ex-
ercise of the postal power, but Justice Field's opinion for the Court
went on to say:
Nor can any regulations be enforced against the transporta-
tion of printed matter in the mail, which is open to examina-
tion, so as to interfere in any manner with the freedom of the
press. Liberty of circulating is as essential to that freedom as
liberty of publishing; indeed, without the circulation, the pub-
lication would be of little value. If, therefore, printed matter
be excluded from the mails, its transportation in any other
way cannot be forbidden by Congress.2
There was a good deal of substantive baggage in Justice Field's
dictum. Implicit in what he said was a recognition of freedom of
movement as a right with constitutional underpinnings, if the
movement were in some sense associated with the exercise of the
freedom to speak or write. In addition, he was quite clear that the
freedoms of speech and press encompassed rights of communica-
tion and dissemination. Congress could not intrude itself between
the speaker or writer and his audience. This approach restricted
federal regulatory power and made the process of communica-
tion-not just the communication itself-a subject of constitu-
tional protection. In Field's dictum was the doctrinal seed for the
late twentieth century development of the "right to know" as an
aspect of the first amendment. 3 At the same time, the result in the
case made it clear that the government was under no obligation to
assist in the dissemination of information; it simply could not pro-
hibit or regulate such dissemination even though, as a practical
matter, exclusion of material from the postal system might be an
effective barrier to the dissemination of information.
71 96 U.S. 727 (1878).
72 Id. at 733.
73 See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, (1982); Virginia State Bd. of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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Practicing Mormons provided the Court with several opportuni-
ties to examine the meaning of the religion clauses. The most nota-
ble of these cases was Reynolds v. United States,"4 which held that
a law against bigamy in the federal territory of Utah did not vio-
late the free exercise clause even though polygamy was one of the
religiously based practices of the Mormons. Reynolds was the first
clear articulation of the speech/action dichotomy by the Supreme
Court. The Court reasoned that one could believe in polyg-
amy-one could even advocate it in an abstract sense as a form of
family organization preferable to monogamy- 75 but one could not
practice polygamy.
The reasoning employed by Justice Waite in his opinion for the
Court was a mixture of historicism and consequentialism. He relied
heavily on what he interpreted to be the framers' intent. In their
writings, especially Jefferson's, he found what he considered to be
a straightforward distinction between governmental powers over
beliefs and actions: "Congress was deprived of all legislative power
over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions which were in
violation of social duties or subversive of good order. ' 76 Polygamy
was an act, not an opinion, and Waite noted that it had been uni-
versally condemned in Europe and America. It had even been a
capital crime for a time in England and Wales. 1
From his brief foray into history Waite proceeded to sociological
analysis. Marriage, he argued, was the fundamental building block
upon which all of society was built. If it should be weakened as an
institution, then the entire social order might crumble into chaos.
The preservation of society was dependent upon the regulation or
prohibition of acts destructive of the social order, even if by such
regulation or prohibition the government limited the individual ex-
pression of one's religious conscience. Otherwise, in Waite's view,
the road to anarchy would be open: "To permit this would be to
74 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
71 This Court did not have to reach the issue, but it is unlikely that the members would
have gone beyond the "bad tendency" test. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652
(1925); infra text accompanying notes 238-40.
76 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164.
7 Id. at 165.
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make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law
of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law
unto himself. ' 78 There is no doubt that monogamy has been the
favored form of family organization among western societies with
Judeo-Christian heritages, although it is by no means the only ba-
sis upon which a social order can be constructed. There is also lit-
tle doubt that a poll of the framers would have found them to
favor monogamy and to disfavor polygamy, and they probably did
not believe that they had legalized bigamy when they wrote the
Constitution. But what the framers thought and what tradition has
been hardly answer the entire question, unless one is prepared to
argue that the Constitution means only what it meant to its late
eighteenth century draftsmen-whatever may have happened in
the meantime7 -- and that the Constitution incorporated the major
traditions of western society into the legal system of the United
States to the exclusion of all other traditions.
The law in question was one against bigamy, a crime having to
do with fraud upon women. Under common law, the husband was
charged with the duty to support his wife, and the wife's estate was
merged with that of the husband. The bigamy law protected an
innocent wife from having her property taken by a putative hus-
band who subsequently reneged on his duty of support. Polyga-
mous practices among Mormons, on the other hand, were not sub-
terfuges for the fraud of innocent women, but were voluntary, open
alliances entered into by adults. Waite's opinion took a law in-
tended to prevent fraud and applied it to justify a particular form
of family organization despite the voluntary, knowing consent of
the adults involved in the arrangement. The Court imposed a
moral judgment based on its understanding of western history and
culture on the proponents of a particular religious practice.
This analysis does not suggest that any practice should be con-
stitutional if it is engaged in for a religious purpose by consenting
78 Id. at 167.
79 Discerning the Framers' intent is a difficult task at best because of the various inter-
ests subsumed within the compromises that resulted in the Constitution. The relevance of
the Framers' general intentions is obvious, but the importance of their thoughts diminishes
as the problems become more specific and involve issues that they never considered.
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adults. Certainly some practices may be so dangerous (e.g., snake
handling) or offensive to public order (e.g., ecstatic dancing in the
streets) that they may be regulated or even prohibited. Others,
such as racial discrimination, may be so destructive of public order
and other values as not to be tolerated even if based on a religious
tenet.80 Nevertheless, Waite's opinion did not even attempt to ana-
lyze the problem from the perspective of individual rights. From
that point of view the Mormons' position would have been: we are
free individuals following our religious conscience and we have
made no attempt to impose our beliefs on any person against his
will; and, therefore, the government must justify its attempt at
regulation. We need not justify our right to act peacefully in accor-
dance with the dictates of our consciences. In Reynolds, the Court
applied not an individualist argument, but one based on collectiv-
ist attitudes of the acceptable which were defined and justified by
reference to history and by an elementary attempt at sociological
consequentialism. 81
Reynolds was not the only case involving polygamy to reach the
Court. In Murphy v. Ramsey, 2 decided seven years later, the
Court affirmed with little discussion the constitutionality of a fed-
eral territorial law requiring an oath that one was not a polygamist
as a condition to voter registration.8 Five years later virtually the
same issue was before the Court again in Davis v. Beason.8 4 Al-
though the Court again upheld the validity of a law of the Terri-
tory of Idaho that prevented polygamists from registering to vote,
the majority paid more attention to the possible constitutional im-
plications. Justice Field, who wrote the opinion, reasoned that it
was permissible to make the act of bigamy a crime even if biga-
mous relationships were part of an expression of religion, and that
it was in turn constitutionally permissible to limit the franchise to
80 See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
81 Despite Justice Waite's concerns, one doubts that polygamy among a few Mormons
in Utah would have shaken the foundations of a Republic that had recently survived the
savageries of a bloody civil war.
82 114 U.S. 15 (1885).
83 On its face, this oath requirement presented an obvious fifth amendment problem,
because bigamy was a crime. The Court, however, utterly ignored this problem in its
reasoning.
84 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
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persons who were not criminals.8 5 In the course of his opinion Jus-
tice Field ventured an attempt to define the meaning of religion:
The term "religion" has reference to one's views of his rela-
tions to his Creator, and to the obligations they impose of
reverence for his Being and Character, and of obedience to
his will. It is often confounded with the cultus or form of wor-
ship of a particular sect, but is distinguishable from the
latter.86
Judges, philosophers, theologians and ordinary citizens have
wrestled with the meaning of religion for centuries. Justice Field
was willing to join the debate, but his definition was one of narrow
dimensions that left much to be regulated by the state in accor-
dance with collective values. Few would argue with the view that
relig on involves an individual's conscience and his personal rela-
tionship with God, and few would support any state intrusion
whatsoever into the minds and hearts of individuals. That does not
take us very far in constitutional lawmaking, because in religious
matters there is almost invariably some outward manifestation of
individual conscience. What Justice Field referred to as the cultus
of a particular sect may involve overt manifestations of religious
belief as disparate as, for example, the wearing of a yarmulke, the
use of wine during the Mass, the pealing of church bells on Easter,
the erection of nativity scenes at Christmas, the display of a fish
on an automobile bumper sticker, or the refusal to work on Friday
or Saturday or Sunday. Surely Justice Field did not mean to say
that the power of the state could be brought to bear on all these
activities simply because they involve acts, simply because they are
part of the cultus or practice of religion as opposed to bare belief.
If he did, then the "free exercise" clause had little meaning to the
Court in 1890-the Constitution might as well have said "free be-
lief' but "exercise subject to state regulation." It is more likely
that Justice Field was writing with more unusual or extreme reli-
gious acts in mind, such as the practice of polygamy, but his al-
most cavalier dismissal of the notion that there is prima facie con-
" Id. at 342-43.
86 Id. at 342.
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stitutional protection for religious practices as well as beliefs
suggests that the Court was not thinking strongly in terms of an
individual rights paradigm in matters of religious belief but was
reflecting the community consensus regarding appropriate forms of
social behavior.
The persecution of the Mormons continued apace as their views
on marriage offended more and more. Congress passed a law affect-
ing the federal territories that was used to revoke a charter of the
Mormon Church and to take over its property to be disposed of for
charitable uses. The rationale was that a charter had been granted
to the Church of 'Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints for "charitable,
religious purposes." Because the church was using its property to
propagate the idea of polygamy, it was not furthering a "charitable
purpose," thereby placing it in abrogation of the charter. This im-
permissible purpose justified revocation of the charter and disposal
of the church property. The Supreme Court upheld this congres-
sional act in Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v.
United States.8 7 Chief Justice Fuller, joined by Justices Field and
Lamar, dissented on the ground that the legislative power be-
stowed by the Constitution to pass certain criminal laws did not
include the power to seize property.8 Although the dissenters' ar-
gument had merit, they did not consider the "free exercise"
problems at all.
After making abundantly clear their antipathy to polygamy, the
members of the Court went on to other matters. Over the next dec-
ade or so the justices decided some half dozen cases that touched
upon first amendment issues.
The first of these, In re Rapier," was a reprise of Ex parte Jack-
son,90 the lottery tickets case. The federal Anti-Lottery Act of 1890
made it a misdemeanor to transport lottery tickets and advertise-
ments for lotteries through the mails. The Supreme Court upheld
87 136 U.S. 1 (1890). This was a long way from the apparent sympathies of the Court in
the case involving Virginia's attempt to expropriate the property of the Episcopal Church.
Cf. Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 (1815).
s Church of Latter Day Saints, 136 U.S. at 67 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
" 143 U.S. 110 (1892).
90 96 U.S. 727 (1878).
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the Act as a valid exercise of the postal power, against arguments
that it infringed upon the rights of speech and press. The Court
noted that the postal power is broad enough to allow Congress to
prohibit from the mails what it cannot regulate directly, and that
the dispensers of lottery tickets were not prohibited, at least by
Congress, from transporting their goods. They were only prohib-
ited from seeking government aid to do so:
The freedom of communication is not abridged within the in-
tent and meaning of the constitutional provision unless Con-
gress is absolutely destitute of any discretion as to what shall
or shall not be carried in the mails, and compelled arbitrarily
to assist in the dissemination of matters condemned by its
judgment, through the governmental agencies which it
controls.9'
The argument over the postal power continues to this day, 2 but,
for the most part, both Ex parte Jackson and In re Rapier remain
the law of the land.
In a decision that had implications for a case more than half a
century later,93 the Court held in 1896 that an official governmen-
tal communication made in the course of administering the func-
tions of an executive department was privileged. 4 The reasoning
was not based on freedom of speech, but rather on the necessity of
ensuring the efficient and candid functioning of government. This
line of argument, however, was one which was to reappear in a
somewhat different guise as an instrumentalist approach to speech
protection. The end posited was efficient and candid government.
This "good" end could be achieved, in part, by the means of fair
comment. Thus speech was partially protected for its utility in
achieving a separately identified social good.
The following year the Court had a thirteenth amendment case
that gave it the opportunity to expound on the jurisprudential un-
derpinnings of the Bill of Rights. At issue in Robertson v. Bald-
9, Rapier, 143 U.S. at 133.
92 See, e.g., United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Assns., 453 U.S.
114 (1981).
Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896).
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win" was a law providing for compulsory service in fulfillment of
the contracts of deserting seamen. This law was attacked as a form
of involuntary servitude in violation of the thirteenth amendment,
but the Court held that amendment to be inapplicable to the con-
tracts of merchant seaman. Whatever the merits of that decision,
Justice Brown took the opportunity to expound at some length on
various aspects of constitutional history and meaning. Of particu-
lar interest was the following passage:
The law is perfectly well settled that the first ten amend-
ments to the Constitution, commonly known as the Bill of
Rights, were not intended to lay down any novel principles of
government, but simply to embody certain guaranties and im-
munities which we had inherited from our English ancestors,
and which had from time immemorial been subject to certain
well recognized exceptions arising from the necessities of the
case. In incorporating these principles into the fundamental
law there was no intention of disregarding the exceptions,
which continued to be recognized as if they had been formally
expressed. Thus, the freedom of speech and of the press...
does not permit the publication of libels, blasphemous or in-
decent articles, or other publications injurious to public
morals or private reputation .... "I"
In Justice Brown's view the Bill of Rights was not a radical de-
parture from previous experience but was merely a codification of
the common law as it existed in 1791. This was certainly no natural
law approach to the individual rights amendments; rather it was a
historical understanding of the first amendment consistent with
the conclusions of Professors Levy 97 and Berns. 98 Both Levy and
Berns, however, argued that the debates over the Sedition Act of
1798 pushed the Jeffersonians toward a libertarian justificatory
model of the first amendment, even though no one had given much
thought to libertarian notions of free speech at the time of the pas-
sage of the Bill of Rights. As far as this argument goes, Levy and
"' 165 U.S. 275 (1897).
" Id. at 281.
L. LEVY, supra note 15.
98 W. BERNS, supra note 16.
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Berns are not inconsistent with Mayton. Professor Mayton's rea-
soning is that the abolition of seditious libel by the Constitution
was a matter of governmental structure and delegation of power
and not an incorporation of natural rights theory into the Consti-
tution. None of these commentators, however, denies that natural
rights philosophers had some effect on the thinking of the framers
that led to the creation of the particular form of government out-
lined in the Constitution. If Brown correctly reflected the view of
the Court in 1897, then there was a consensus on the Court about
the Bill of Rights, including the first amendment, that was not
founded on any generalized individual rights paradigm. In the
Court's view the first ten amendments were simply a "restate-
ment" of the common law and did nothing to advance American
constitutional law beyond the then existing English law, at least to
the extent that individual rights were concerned.
Justice Brown's opinion goes to the heart of the fundamental de-
bates about the purposes and perceptions of the framers. Was the
Constitution a means for the radical re-structuring of the concept
of government? Were the rights listed in the Bill of Rights merely
illustrative of those human rights that the federal government
could not regulate? Was the Bill of Rights a charter of libertarian
values, a statement of rights protected from all government? Or
was the Constitution simply a means for the organization of the
American Republic along the lines of English parliamentary gov-
ernment without a monarch, and the Bill of Rights simply a state-
ment of common law rights available to all Englishmen? Professor
Mayton certainly is of the view that the framers had in mind a
significant departure from the English practices with respect to
speech issues.99 Professors Levy1 00 and Berns1 °' are much less cer-
tain that the framers had such a departure in mind at least, in
Levy's view,102 until the debates on the Alien and Sedition Act of
1798. Alexander Hamilton, for one, was concerned that a bill of
rights might undo much of what the Constitution did. Hamilton
Mayton, supra note 17, at 140-42.
100 L. LEvY, supra note 15.
W. BERNS, supra note 16.
102 L. LEVY, supra note 15, at 259-97. Berns thought the central problems were slavery
and states rights. See supra note 25.
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feared that by listing protected rights there could be implied the
existence of the power to regulate such rights, whereas the absence
of any mention expressly indicated the absence of any power. 10 3
According to Professor Mayton, Hamilton's exceptions to a Bill of
Rights were well taken.10 4
Those who argued against the addition of a laundry list of rights
to the Constitution for fear of implying an otherwise nonexistent
governmental power did not prevail, but Brown's opinion suggests
that their worries were not unfounded. In the late nineteenth cen-
tury it was abundantly clear that American common law courts
had borrowed heavily from the English courts over the years.
There were modifications which were to be expected in any com-
mon law system, but the English common law formed the basis for
much of the American common law. If the Bill of Rights did no
more than codify the common law of individual rights, then the ten
amendments amounted to nothing but a series of truisms. Such a
viewpoint, however, does not make sense as a matter of history or
of analysis. There was an English common law background as to
speech, press, unreasonable searches, jury trials and other matters.
But the religion clauses, the second amendment provisions on
arms, the third amendment provisions on quartering soldiers, and
the eighth amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punish-
ment were patent breaks with the English practice. There may
have been some common law antecedents, but these amendments
indicated a desire to shift away from English common law in cer-
tain fundamental areas. In addition, the two major structural com-
ponents of the American system-the federalism which dispersed
power, and the concept of a government of limited powers dele-
gated by the people-were radical departures from English govern-
ment in both fact and theory. The argument could be more fully
developed, but it seems reasonably clear that Justice Brown's un-
derstanding of the framers' intent with respect to the Bill of
Rights was unnecessarily narrow and historically inaccurate.
It is interesting, however, that the Court in 1897 gave credence
,03 THE FEDERALIST No. 86 (A. Hamilton).
,04 Mayton, supra note 17, at 122. He argues persuasively that Madison and James
Wilson, among others, shared Hamilton's concern. Id. at 121-23.
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to a reading of the Bill of Rights such as that advanced by Brown.
Libertarian sentiments, to the extent the Court expressed them,
were largely confined to judicial interpretations of "liberty" in the
fourteenth amendment. 105 This interpretation limited the Court to
overturning state intrusions into demarcated areas of "liberty."
Yet whenever an intrusion concerned the federal government,
Brown's analysis of the Bill of Rights left little room for the devel-
opment of any sophisticated theory of individual liberty. Indeed,
his view seemed to freeze the restraints on federal action into an
eighteenth century English mold.
Also in 1897 the Court heard an appeal, in Davis v. Massachu-
setts,206 from a conviction for speaking on a public commons with-
out first obtaining a permit from the mayor. The first amendment
still was considered to be inapplicable to state action, and the case
was heard under the fourteenth. The opinion is interesting to com-
pare with the property and freedom of contract cases in which the
Court used an expansive reading of the word "liberty" in the due
process clause to invalidate various state legislative actions.10 7 Da-
vis presented a clear instance of a regulation of the "liberty" of
speech, but the speaker's interests as an individual were addressed
in a slighting way. The local ordinance was upheld as a valid police
power regulation and the fourteenth amendment was said to create
no individual right to the use of public property. Any use would be
at the sufferance of the government, which, in the Court's view,
stood in the same shoes as a private landowner: "For the legisla-
ture absolutely or conditionally to forbid public speaking in a high-
way or public park is no more an infringement of the rights of a
member of the public than for the owner of a private house to for-
bid it in his house." 08 Whatever the speech interests of Davis may
have been, the Court did not believe them to be within the concept
of "liberty" nor a matter of "personal right" sufficient to outweigh
the state's police power interests in the maintenance of order in
1o' See, e. g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S.
578 (1897).
"0s 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
107 See e.g., Lochner, Alleyer; Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Muller v. Oregon,
208 U.S. 412 (1908); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
'18 Davis, 167 U.S. at 47.
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public parks. If any sort of "liberty right" had been recognized Da-
vis might still have lost, but at least the burden would have been
shifted to the state to require it to justify the regulation, or to
identify the source of its power to regulate.
The last case to be addressed in this section was actually decided
in 1904, but it provides a good transition. The case involved an
alien who was denied admission to the United States because of his
anarchist sympathies. His political colleagues were later to provide
the twentieth century Court with opportunities to develop a juris-
prudence of the first amendment, but this first free speech case of
the twentieth century was decided in a nineteenth century manner
despite its portents of things to come.
The case, United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 109 involved
the question whether the Immigration Act of 1903, which excluded
aliens who were anarchists from admission to the United States,
was an unconstitutional limitation on free speech. The Court
largely sidestepped the first amendment question by deciding that
the first amendment only protected citizens and aliens who had
been admitted in compliance with the law. Congress had plenary
power with respect to the admission of aliens, and an alien who
had not been admitted had no standing to assert a constitutional
claim.
If the Court had stopped there, the case would have been of only
minor interest for its definition of the bounds of American consti-
tutionalism, as well as for the Court's deference to legislative wis-
dom in matters of immigration. But the Court went on to address,
in part, the appellant's argument that the statute was unconstitu-
tional because it was overinclusive, for those who merely believed
in anarchist principles as a matter of abstract philosophical
thought were to be excluded along with those who were activists
and wanted to overthrow the government. The majority opinion,
written by Chief Justice Fuller, reasoned that the "natural" right
of a government to self-preservation justified regulation of belief
and the profession of belief-not merely of action or incite-
ment-if the belief in question was of a dangerous tendency. In the
IOD 194 U.S. 279 (1904).
1986]
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
words of the Chief Justice:
If the word "anarchists" should be interpreted as including
aliens whose anarchistic views are professed as those of politi-
cal philosophers innocent of evil intent, it would follow that
Congress was of the opinion that the tendency of the general
exploitation of such views is so dangerous to the public weal
that aliens who hold and advocate them would be undesirable
additions to our population, whether permanently or tempo-
rarily, whether many or few, and, in the light of previous de-
cisions, the act, even in this aspect, would not be unconstitu-
tional, or as applicable to any alien who is opposed to all
organized government. . . . [A]s long as human governments
endure they cannot be denied the power of self-preservation,
as that question is presented here.110
Justice Brewer, in a concurring opinion, tried to soften the
Court's approach somewhat by suggesting that issues not before
the Court should not be decided. His reading of the record con-
vinced him that it was not unreasonable to conclude that peti-
tioner was an anarchist who believed in the violent overthrow of
government."" If that conclusion were not so, Brewer reasoned, the
petitioner should have submitted some evidence to the contrary.
Having failed to do so it was only reasonable to take the case as it
was-one of the exclusion of a person committed to the violent
overthrow of government. It was not necessary to consider the ap-
plicability of the statute to an individual who was merely a thinker
or a philosopher and not an activist." 2 Even though Brewer was
more sympathetic to the petitions than his brethren in the major-
ity, his reasoning continued to impose the burden of proof on the
110 Id. at 294.
Id. at 296 (Brewer, J., concurring).
112 The concurrence stated:
It was not an unreasonable deduction therefrom that petitioner is an anarchist in
the commonly accepted sense of the term, one who urges and seeks the overthrow
by force of all government. If that be not the fact, he should have introduced
testimony to establish the contrary. It is unnecessary, therefore, to consider what
rights he would have if he were only what is called by way of differentiation a
philosophical anarchist, one who simply entertains and expresses the opinion that
all government is a mistake, and that society would be better of without any.
Id. at 296 (Brewer, J., concurring).
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individual. The presumption was in favor of, rather than opposed
to, government regulation. The Turner case identified themes that
would recur frequently in subsequent cases: Does a government
have an inherent right of self-preservation? If so, to what extent is
it restrained by countervailing principles of individual right?"13 To
what extent is there a distinction among belief, speech, other forms
of expression and overt acts? Is there a calculus of state concern
that is a function of these differences? What are the constitutional
limits on the power of government to regulate at all?
The questions implied by the Turner case provide a good intro-
duction to the Holmes era of the Court, the period during which
the first amendment became a significant topic of constitutional
concern. The Turner case, with its deference to Congress and with
its willingness to accept the proposition (at least as dictum) that
radical ideas as well as actions could be regulated, might be close
to the nineteenth century cases and the Court's consistent refusal
to give any real substance to the language of the first amendment.
In summary, the Supreme Court during its first full century of
operation: (i) refused to apply first amendment safeguards to the
states; (ii) refused to read the "liberty" clause of the fourteenth
amendment to include the rights of speech, press and religion; (iii)
read the first amendment as a restatement of the English common
law of 1791 which allowed government regulation of many areas of
speech; (iv) applied collective standards to define religion with lit-
tle regard for the individual interests of believers; and (v) generally
ignored libertarian theories of speech, press and religion. Although
few in number, the cases that were reported during the nineteenth
century display a limited and uncertain concept of first amend-
ment freedoms. Nevertheless, there existed a lively press, flourish-
ing publishing houses, and abundant speech making. The Court's
inability or refusal to develop any coherent or systematic approach
to the first amendment other than one of deference to legislative
wisdom had little impact on communication for which there was
large scale demand. Problems arose, as is so often the case, with
I's Of course the Turner case also involved the basic question of who was a member of
the national society-that is, who could even raise the question of an individual right.
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minority groups such as the Mormons or with those on the fringes
of politics, such as anarchist sympathizers, for whom there was lit-
tle community concern or tolerance. The cases seem to support the
conclusions reached by Professor Nagel in a recent article that ju-
dicial review does not necessarily maximize the protection of
speech, and that what judges say often has little impact on the
availability of information, ideas and entertainment that appeal to
the great mass of people. 114 The impact of what Professor Rabban
has characterized as "a general hostility to the value of free expres-
sion '115 was felt primarily by those who were unpopular, isolated,
politically impotent, or otherwise outside the mainstream.
III. THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY: 1907-1930
Appropriately, the case that begins this section is the first Su-
preme Court opinion by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes dealing
with a free press question. At issue in Patterson v. Colorado'1 6 was
a state conviction for contempt based upon the publication of arti-
cles critical of the conduct of state court judges in pending cases.
In upholding the contempt convictions Holmes reasoned: (i) that
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment did not incor-
porate state law so as to permit review by federal courts of local
law questions, and (ii) that it was unnecessary to consider four-
teenth amendment arguments anyway because the first amend-
ment did not prohibit subsequent punishment, only prior re-
straints.1 7 Whatever the merit of Holmes' incorporation (or non-
incorporation) argument, his substantive understanding of the first
amendment in 1907 was purely Blackstonian." 5
The first Justice Harlan disagreed with Holmes about the sub-
stantive meaning of the first amendment and about incorporation.
In Harlan's view, free speech was a right of national citizenship. 1 9
"' Nagel, supra note 2.
Rabban, Forgotten Years, supra note 18, at 557.
116 205 U.S. 454 (1907).
17 Id. at 462.
118 Id. The defendant also had argued the defense of truth on appeal, but Justice
Holmes discussed that argument as being irrelevant in a contempt case.
"' Patterson, 205 U.S. at 464 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Thus it was among the "privileges and immunities" guaranteed to
citizens of the United States and in turn protected from state ac-
tion. The first amendment was, therefore, incorporated by the
fourteenth. 120 Furthermore, Harlan argued that the first amend-
ment was not simply a shield against prior censorship but also pre-
vented any kind of governmental restraint on free speech. The
prior restraint/subsequent punishment distinction was not merito-
rious because post-speech sanctions could restrain speech by deter-
ring it and thus be as much a form of censorship as prior re-
straint. 21 The issues posed by the case were not ones that should
be treated lightly, according to Harlan, because freedom of speech
was inextricably linked to the preservation of individual liberty in
a democratic society: "It is, I think, impossible to conceive of lib-
erty, as secured by the Constitution against hostile action, whether
by the Nation or by the States, which does not embrace the right
to enjoy free speech and the right to have a free press.' '1 22
The gulf between Harlan's and Holmes' respective understand-
ings of the central meaning of the first amendment was great. 23
Holmes seemed to be parrotting Blackstone and Justice Brown's
opinion in Robertson v. Baldwin,124 in which Brown had character-
ized the Constitution and the Bill of Rights as little more than an
American codification of the late eighteenth century common law.
Harlan, by comparison, seemed to read the Constitution, and par-
ticularly the first and fourteenth amendments, as a departure from
the common law and a means for the protection of those liberties
essential to individual development and self-government. In the
Holmes opinion we see support for the Levy-Berns interpretation
of the original understanding, and in the Harlan dissent we find
the outline of the principal twentieth century theories of Chafee,
120 Id.
"I Id. at 465. See also Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 579 (1951) (Black, J.,
dissenting); Hunter, Toward a Better Understanding of the Prior Restraint Doctrine: A
Reply to Professor Mayton, 67 CORNELL L. R-v. 283, 293 (1982).
122 Patterson, 205 U.S. at 465 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
12' The incorporation debate was itself enormously significant. Although the funda-
mental argument has continued for years, the Supreme Court meekly accepted the incorpo-
ration of the first amendment with virtually no comment less than twenty years after Pat-
terson. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
124 165 U.S. 275 (1897).
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Meiklejohn, and Emerson.12 5
Two relatively minor cases, Halter v. Nebraska12 s in 1907 and
Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co.127 in 1911, followed. Neither
did much to advance the understanding of the first amendment,
but they each dealt with speech related questions that were to re-
appear later in the century.
Nebraska's flag desecration statute had been applied to prohibit
the use of the American flag on beer bottle labels. The private use
of the flag in this manner suggested both symbolic speech 12 and
commercial speech 2 9 questions, but the Court never had to reach
those questions. In an opinion by Justice Harlan, the Court ruled
that there was no individual right to use the flag for private pur-
poses. It was a collectively owned and controlled symbol, and there
was no invasion of a "privilege or immunity" by either a state or
federal regulation that limited flag use. 13 0
The Gompers case presented a speech/action question, and the
Court later used a similar rationale in a number of the World
War I Espionage Act decisions. The trial court had issued an in-
junction prohibiting the publication of statements in connection
with a labor boycott. Although the injunction was directed at
speech, the Court reasoned that the speech was made up of "verbal
acts" which were integrated with and impossible to separate from
the coercive acts of the boycott. This speech was likened to the
speech that is integral to the commission of a crime such as fraud
or extortion, in that it was substantively indistinguishable from the
acts that were properly subject to regulation. The decision was
125 See Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941); T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM
OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1971); A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM; THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE (1960).
126 205 U.S. 34 (1907).
12- 221 U.S. 418 (1911).
"' See, e.g., Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
129 See, Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316
U.S. 52 (1942).
130 This view has by no means gone out of date. See, e.g., Spence v. Washington, 418
U.S. 405 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (Fortas, J.,
dissenting).
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unanimous. 131 Even a prior restraint was acceptable to all mem-
bers of the Court in 1911 if the speech were not "pure" but was
closely tied to antisocial acts.
The Court's next excursion into the free speech area came by
way of the post office. Under the mail classification scheme devised
by Congress, varying kinds of materials qualified for varying rates
and services, and newspapers qualified for second class privileges.
In effect, this scheme meant that newspapers were treated much
the same as first class materials but were accorded substantially
reduced rates. Through this system of classification, the post office
intended to assist in the rapid and inexpensive distribution of
newspapers. As a condition to qualifying for second class privi-
leges, Congress required that newspapers periodically identify their
owners and publish their circulation figures. In Lewis Publishing
Co. v. Morgan,13 2 decided in 1913, the Supreme Court unanimously
upheld the disclosure requirements against an argument that they
abridged press freedom. The Court noted that there was no at-
tempt to regulate the content of any publication or to exclude any
publication from the mails. Indeed, the statute discriminated in
favor of newspapers by subsidizing their mailing costs and was
thereby a means for the encouragement of press freedom. The dis-
closure requirements were merely incidental to the classification
scheme and were, in the Court's view, generally supportive of the
goal of information dissemination because they made available ma-
terial that might be useful in trying to identify a newspaper's bias.
In Chief Justice White's words:
[W]e are concerned not with any general regulation of what
should be published in newspapers, not with any condition
excluding from the right to resort to the mails, but we are
concerned solely and exclusively with the right on behalf of
the publishers to continue to enjoy great privileges and ad-
"' In his opinion for the Court, Justice Lamar noted:
But whatever the requirement of the particular jurisdiction ... the strong current
of authority is that the publication and use of letters, circulars and printed matter
may constitute a means whereby a boycott is unlawfully continued, and their use
for such purpose may amount to a violation of the order of injunction.
221 U.S. at 437.
12 229 U.S. 288 (1913).
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vantages at the public expense, a right given to them by Con-
gress upon condition of compliance with regulations deemed
by that body incidental and necessary to the complete frui-
tion of the public policy lying at the foundation of the privi-
leges accorded.133
Notwithstanding the broad authority of Congress under the pos-
tal power, there were some elements of the Court's opinion that
could be used to justify extensive governmental control of content.
At the heart of the White opinion was the notion that the govern-
ment does not have to confer certain benefits at all, such as second
class mailing privileges, and that if it chooses to do so the conferral
may be made on a condition. The government, in White's view,
was like an offeror who proposed a contract on specified terms, and
the offeree could accept or reject it. This line of argument contin-
ues to have vitality.1' 4 Carried to its conclusion, it could justify ex-
tensive content regulation as the condition for the conferral of a
certain privilege. The nature of a condition, however, may be such
that substantive first or fourteenth amendment considerations are
brought into play. White's opinion seemed to recognize this possi-
bility because the disclosure requirements were characterized as
"incidental" and were said not to involve exclusion or content reg-
ulation. The implication was that there were some limits that
would be imposed on the exercise of the postal power to achieve
collateral goals. In subsequent years the Court has imposed some
such limitations, despite adherence to the general "contract" ap-
proach of the White opinion." 5
There were two other strands in the Lewis Publishing decision
that addressed slightly different aspects of the substantive first
amendment problem. To what extent might Congress prefer news-
papers over other businesses and individuals? To what extent
"3 Id. at 316.
"' See e.g., Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
In general, the government cannot limit a constitutional right as a condition for the
enjoyment of a welfare benefit or public employment. See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of
Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). The nature of the
job or the benefit, however, may justify some limitations. See, e.g., Cabell v. Charcz-Salido,
454 U.S. 432 (1982); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
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might Congress seek to encourage the wider dissemination of infor-
mation and thereby directly or indirectly affect content? The
Court in Lewis Publishing explicitly approved a congressional
scheme that clearly discriminated in favor of newspapers,
magazines and other periodicals. Although this discrimination sug-
gested a facial equal protection problem, the Court had no diffi-
culty in finding such a discrimination to be justified by policies
rooted in the first amendment-policies supporting the widespread
distribution of news and information. Subsequent judicial deci-
sions have struck down as violative of the first amendment legisla-
tion that disadvantaged newspapers as a class in comparison to
other business enterprises.136 If the legislature may discriminate in
favor of newspapers for the purpose of promoting wider distribu-
tion of information, then may it do so more directly by seeking to
ensure that newspapers present all sides of an issue and cover the
news completely, fairly and accurately? That is what the Federal
Communications Commission purports to do in its substantive
content regulation of television and radio, although the public
ownership of a limited resource-the microwave spectrum-is the
justifying factor. 137 It is not a long step from some of the implica-
tions of the Lewis Publishing opinion to a justification of some
kind of generalized fairness doctrine applicable to all media. Argu-
ments along this line have been made,138 but so far they have been
rejected by the Supreme Court as applied to the print media.3 9
Nevertheless, the Court has not abandoned the argument alto-
gether, because it reappears in a modified form in the opinions di-
rected toward the definition and justification of a "right to hear"
as a corollary of the "right to speak.' 40 The members of the Court
may have thought that Lewis Publishing was a rather simple,
,36 Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 103 S.Ct. 1365
(1983).
'7 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367
(1969).
,38 Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1641 (1967).
" Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
'10 Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982); Hunter, Curriculum, Pedagogy, and the
Constitutional Rights of Teachers in Secondary Schools, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 43-47
(1983).
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straightforward case, but the issues touched upon and not decided
in the case have continued to be a part of the Court's work for
more than seventy years.
Two years later the Court had its first look at the movies in a
pair of cases attacking the constitutionality of motion picture re-
view boards in Kansas and Ohio that licensed films for public exhi-
bition, but only after prior review by the boards.141 Each state had
a classic administrative censorship system, but the Court unani-
mously upheld the licensing schemes because movies simply were
not covered by the first amendment. Justice McKenna, the author
of both opinions, said:
[t]hey take their attraction from the general interest, eager
and wholesome it may be, in their subjects, but a prurient
interest may be excited and appealed to. Besides, there are
some things which should not have pictorial representation in
public places and to all audiences .. . They are mere repre-
sentations of events, of ideas and sentiments published and
known, vivid, useful and entertaining no doubt, but, as we
have said, capable of evil, having power for it, the greater be-
cause of their attractiveness and manner of exhibition.14 2
There is often a temptation to read too much into an opinion,
especially with the perspective of long-range hindsight. These cases
were, after all, the first serious attempt to deal with a new and
then very minor technology. Nevertheless, there is apparent in the
Court's opinion the idea that the first amendment protects "speech
that matters" or that is related in some way to politics and the
processes of democracy. Professor Alexander Meiklejohn was to
develop this notion most fully in his book Political Freedom,143 in
which he argued that the first amendment is justified by reason of
the necessity of free speech to the perpetuation of self-government.
Thus "political speech" is subject to almost absolute protection,
but "non-political" speech is, in the Meiklejohn view, subject only
to ordinary due process protections.
141 Mutual Film Corp. v. Ohio Indus'l Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230 (1915); Mutual Film Corp.
v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 248 (1915).
142 236 U.S. at 242, 244.
,43 A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 112.
[Vol. 35
FIRST AMENDMENT 1791-1930
The first movie cases also left open the door for states to use
their police powers to control those types of speech that had been
subject to regulation at common law, such as libelous, blasphemous
or obscene speech. Furthermore, these decisions countenanced
prior censorship when the expression in question was not really
speech, or at least was not significant speech.""'
That same year the Court began what later came to be a regular
practice of reading and reviewing literature of a prurient nature. 45
In question was a pamphlet entitled "The Nude and the Prudes."
The publisher had been convicted of violating a state law prohibit-
ing the publication of material that incited or tended to incite the
commission of a crime on the theory that the pamphlet could be
understood to encourage readers to break the state law against in-
decent exposure. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Holmes
rejected the defendant's first amendment challenge to the convic-
tion by reasoning that the law, as applied and as interpreted by
the state courts, only punished speech that was essentially part of
an illegal act because of its close causal nexus with the act.'46 This
decision went one step beyond Gompers. There the acts that
caused concern-those of the labor boycott-were in progress and
the words enjoined were understood to be part and parcel of those
acts. In this case there had been no act, no public nudity, that was
shown to be causally connected with "The Nude and the Prudes."
It was the possibility that some reader might be encouraged to
shed his clothes, coupled with the obvious distaste of the author
for the indecent exposure statute, that justified punishment of the
publisher. Interestingly, the first amendment argument was ana-
lyzed substantively even though there had been no stated change
in the Court's approach to incorporation since its decision in Pat-
terson v. Colorado eight years earlier.
At the time he wrote "The Nude and the Prudes" opinion
Holmes was just four years away from the publication of his "clear
"'1 The movies were treated as proper subjects for ordinary police power regulation
pursuant to the principles of federalism, and prior restraints were consistent with that kind
of regulation.
" Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273 (1915).
146 Id. at 277-78.
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and present danger" test in Schenck v. United States147 and his
famous "marketplace of ideas" dissent in Abrams v. United
States.148 In these two cases he began to develop his more system-
atic and more government restrictive theories of speech. But in
1915, Holmes was clearly willing to approve criminal sanctions for
the publication of a minor diatribe about a minor law because
there was some remote possibility that some person with a highly
susceptible personality might be encouraged to perform an act that
was merely socially distasteful, not dangerous or violent, just
shocking to the sensibilities of those schooled in Victorian man-
ners. Public nudity may not be a virtue to be rewarded, but it is
undoubtedly of less concern to the operation of government than
encouraging draft resistance in the midst of a war.
By 1915 there still had been few cases on free speech issues, and
there was only a rudimentary jurisprudence. Despite Justice
Harlan's somewhat libertarian dissent in Patterson v. Colorado,
the predominant view on the Court, and one shared by Holmes,
was essentially Blackstonian. The first amendment prohibited
prior restraints, but subsequent punishment was acceptable so long
as the government had some colorably rational basis for its action.
Furthermore, some expressive activities were not even deemed
"speech" and, therefore, could properly be censored or restrained.
There was not anything Blackstonian about federalism, but it
added another element of uncertainty, for the Court (with the ex-
ception of Justice Harlan) seemed to believe that the states were
essentially free to take their own course of action, free from federal
constitutional limitations. 49 This scheme based on Blackstone and
federalism all changed in the next few years. Conventional wisdom
credits the First World War and the Espionage Act for the
changes, and certainly the war and attendant legislation were the
catalysts for many of the disputes that came before the Court and
that presented first amendment issues in a clear, straightforward
147 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
"s 250 U.S. 616, 624-31 (1919).
M The federalism question contained a good deal of uncertainty because the Court
sometimes discussed first amendment principles as if they were applicable to a given situa-
tion but since the Court refused to incorporate the first amendment through the fourteenth
this discussion seemed out of place.
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fashion. The appointment of Louis Brandeis to the Court, however,
should not be overlooked. He teamed with Holmes on many of the
most important decisions of the ensuing twelve to fifteen years.
The maturity of Brandeis' ideas about individual rights must have
had an effect upon Holmes, for the latter's writings became ever
more sympathetic to questions of individual rights, especially in
matters of opinion and belief.150
The first of the wartime cases involved the selective service law
itself. In Arver v. United States,5' more popularly known as The
Selective Draft Law Cases, the Court sustained the draft by read-
ing the congressional power to raise and support an Army and
Navy 52 to include the power to compel military service The stat-
ute also was attacked because it exempted ministers and theologi-
cal students from the mandatory registration provisions and pro-
vided an option of nonmilitary service for conscientious objectors.
The Court gave short shrift to the argument that the exemptions
violated the establishment clause by giving preference to organized
religions, and violated the free exercise clause by requiring the re-
gistration of religious persons not fitting the descriptions in the
statute. Chief Justice White, for the Court, said:
[a]nd we pass without anything but statement the proposition
that an establishment of a religion or an interference with the
free exercise thereof repugnant to the First Amendment re-
sulted from the exemption clauses of the act ... because we
think its unsoundness is too apparent to require us to do
more.153
During the next two or three years the Court seemed to be grap-
pling constantly with first amendment issues. In lieu of the occa-
sional and rather casually treated case, the Court suddenly was
faced with a series of cases that began to set the tone for the grad-
"' See Rabban, supra note 18, at 1332-45.
"' 245 U.S. 366 (1918).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
1"' Arver, 245 U.S. at 389-90. The Arver opinion was used to dispose of all the contem-
poraneous challenges to the draft law. Jones v. Perkins, 245 U.S. 390 (1918); Goldman v.
United States, 245 U.S. 474 (1918); YanYar v. United States, 246 U.S. 649 (1918); Stephens
v. United States, 247 U.S. 504 (1918).
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ual development of a jurisprudence of the first amendment. The
first in this series did not arise from the war and had to do with
judicial rather than legislative power, but the Court articulated the
government self-preservation rationale that was to be so much a
part of its decision-making in subsequent cases.
The background of Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States
15 4
was almost quaint. The local franchise for street railways in Toledo
was on the verge of expiration when a dispute arose about its ex-
tension. As part of a rapidly developing disagreement between the
streetcar company and the city government, the city enacted an
ordinance setting the rates for street railways. The company and
its creditors sued to enjoin the city from enforcing the ordinance
because they feared that rate regulation would affect the com-
pany's profitability. The local newspaper began to publish articles
supportive of the city's position and editorials giving its opinion
about how the case should be decided. The whole matter became
an even hotter local political topic. The court hearing the case
against the city held an individual in contempt for comments he
made about the proceeding at a labor union meeting. The newspa-
per then added this prosecution to its own points of criticism
about the case. Finally, the court held the newspaper itself in con-
tempt because it had: (i) tried to tell the court how to decide the
case, (ii) incited the public mind in a certain direction, (iii) sug-
gested that court orders it thought were improper might be dis-
obeyed and (iv) published articles of a character to raise doubts in
the public mind about whether any of the court's orders should be
obeyed. 155 The Supreme Court upheld the contempt citation, rea-
soning that it was an appropriate exercise of the implied right of
self-preservation necessary to protect the institutions of govern-
ment. In an interesting bit of logic the Court said that courts are
themselves one set of constitutional institutions designed to pro-
tect press freedom, among other things, and a verbal attack on the
courts which might bring them into disrepute was almost the same
as an attack on press freedom itself.156 In other words, the trial
154 247 U.S. 402 (1918).
1" Id. at 414-15.
158 "The safeguarding and fructification of free and constitutional institutions is the
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court had held the newspaper in contempt for its own good.
Justice Holmes dissented157 and was joined by Brandeis. His
principal concern was not with the first amendment but with the
potential abuse of the contempt power. 5 '
For national security reasons Congress enacted the Espionage
Act of 1917, which prohibited a wide range of activities that Con-
gress believed to be subversive.I59 In three unanimous decisions au-
thored by Justice Holmes, Schenck v. United States,160 Frohwerk
v. United States ' and Debs v. United States,6 2 the Supreme
Court sustained criminal convictions for printing and mailing a cir-
cular opposing the draft, for the publication of articles in a Ger-
man language newspaper that were sympathetic to Germany and
critical of the United States, and for making a speech that glorified
socialism, criticized the war and praised those who had the courage
of their convictions and resisted the draft.
Although Schenck lost his case, the arguments of his lawyers and
the rationale of Holmes' opinion actually became the bellwethers
for constitutional protection in later cases. Schenck's lawyers ar-
gued that speech could only be restrained or punished if its pri-
mary purpose was to incite forbidden action or if it did in fact
incite forbidden action. The nexus with an act was the key; speech
expressing simply an honest political opinion could not be pun-
ished no matter how noxious the government might find the
speaker's politics to be.16 3 Holmes came close to adopting this view
in his statement of the now famous "clear and present danger"
very basis and mainstay upon which the freedom of the press rests, and that freedom, there-
fore, does not and cannot be held to include the right virtually to destroy such institutions."
Toledo Newspaper, 247 U.S. at 419.
57 Toledo Newspaper, 247 U.S. at 422 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justices Day and
Clarke did not participate.
, ' The statute stated that contempt should issue only as to ."misbehavior of any per-
son in their presence, or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice." Judi-
cial Code, Act of March 3, 1911, § 268, 36 Stat. 1163 (1911), quoted in Toledo Newspaper,
247 U.S. at 423 (Holmes, J. dissenting).
40 Stat. 217 (1917).
160 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
6- 249 U.S. 204 (1919).
162 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
163 63 L.Ed. 470, 471 (summarizing the brief filed by Schenck).
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test:
[The] question in every case is whether the words are used in
such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a
clear and present danger that they will bring about the sub-
stantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a
question of proximity and degree.164
In this particular case Holmes was convinced that there was a
"clear and present danger" that the circulars in question might
have had an effect upon the operation of the draft. He reasoned
that Schenck and his colleagues would not have bothered to print
and distribute the circulars if they had not intended them to have
an effect, and the only effect they were meant to have was to influ-
ence men to refuse the draft or to try to obstruct it."1 5 This reason-
ing reduced the clear and present danger test to hollow symbolism
because it meant that only frivolous speech or speech so patently
absurd as to have no persuasive value was all that could be pro-
tected. Saying that government punishment is justified because
someone intended the meaning of what he said means that govern-
ment can punish any speech that might be construed by a listener
to advocate a particular anti-social act. 6' The test became more
important for its language than for its actual application in
Schenck. The result was consistent with the "hostile" decisions of
the pre-war era, but Holmes' language lent itself to more liberal
interpretation and application.1 67
' 249 U.S. at 52.
"' "Of course the document would not have been sent unless it had been intended to
have some effect, and we do not see what effect it could be expected to have upon persons
subject to the draft except to influence them to obstruct the carrying of it out." Schenck,
249 U.S. at 51.
18' The most extreme example that comes to mind is that of an English murderer who
was driven to commit his crimes when he witnessed the liturgy of the Anglican Church.
117 Holmes was "revised" by Chafee and others who read their own ideas into the clear
and present danger formula. If Holmes meant that the security of the state had to be in
imminent danger, he could hardly have voted to convict Schenck. He obviously had in mind
a more generalized threat that the government had power to attack in its incipiency. See
Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. CI. L.R. 1205
(1983); 0. ROGGE, THE FIRST AND THE FirTH 53 (1960) (describing the clear and present
danger test as "a mistaken application of the criminal law of attempt and conspiracy to the
field of speech").
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Holmes probably did not mean to go quite so far, because he did
tie the intent of the speaker to the persuasiveness of the speech to
incite a particular act. Schenck's circulars were clear calls to civil
disobedience. The great distinction between Holmes and a com-
mentator such as Professor Mayton is that Holmes did not require
an overt act, only a possible connection, a "clear and present" con-
nection, between speech and an act that might not occur until
some future time. Mayton's argument is that the Constitution does
not allow punishment for sedition unless an act has already taken
place. 168 In the Holmes formula, the content of the speech was es-
pecially important in determining intent and causal nexus. This
formula thereby opened the door as widely as possible to judicial
content analysis as well as a review of motives. Although this em-
phasis on content might have provided a partial safeguard against
arbitrary abuses by prosecutors, police and trial judges, Professor
Nagel has concluded that judicial content review has been a mixed
blessing at best.169
Holmes did take into consideration historical antecedents, for he
also said, "[i]t well may be that the prohibition of laws abridging
the freedom of speech is not confined to previous restraints, al-
though to prevent them may have been the main purpose . "...,170
This statement marked a shift from his view in Patterson v. Colo-
rado, ' 7 and was a grudging recognition that the first amendment
might provide a shield against subsequent punishment as well as
against prior restraints.
The Schenck opinion also made context extraordinarily impor-
tant. Content was critical because intent and persuasive power
were important to the determination of the connection between
speech and acts that might be prohibited, but content analysis
could not be separated from contextual analysis in the Holmesian
calculus. Where the speech occurred, to whom it was directed and
the volatility of the circumstances were all factors relevant to the
188 See Mayton, supra note 17, at 115-17.
"' Nagel, supra note 2. See also Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amend-
ment, 25 WiA. & MARY L. REv. 189 (1983).
170 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 51.
17 205 U.S. 454 (1907).
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question of the connection between the speech and forbidden acts.
In prior attempts to deal with first amendment arguments, vari-
ous members of the Court had given some indications of theoreti-
cal concerns, but, for the most part, decisions were based either on
textual analysis or on what the Court determined to be proper his-
torical precedents. Leaving aside the federalism/states' rights argu-
ments, the Court had either followed a fairly straightforward anal-
ysis which allowed subsequent punishment but not prior restraint;
or had relied on custom and common law, as in the bigamy cases,
without breathing any separate life into the first amendment. In
Schenck there appear elements, however, of utilitarian instrumen-
talist thinking flavored with American pragmatism. There is not
the substantive due process "liberty" notion that speech is pro-
tected because it is a part of personal liberty outside the power of
any government. Of course, the substantive due process majority
had never gone as far with speech as it had with property interests
and related "liberties" such as freedom of contract and the "right"
to pursue an occupation.7 2 In the Patterson decision, Justice
Harlan had defined free speech as an essential requisite of "lib-
erty," but his colleagues never followed suit. The language used by
Holmes in Schenck indicated movement toward a view of speech
as an instrument for the attainment and preservation of lib-
erty-not as a part of liberty itself but as a means to the end of
liberty. This development continued in the series of cases closely
following the Schench decision.
The Frohwerk opinion, also by Holmes and also for a unanimous
Court, sustained an Espionage Act conviction for the publication
of pro-German articles in the newspaper Missouri Staats Zeitung.
These publications were said to be calculated to cause disruptions
in the military forces because of their criticisms of American poli-
cies. The newspaper's lawyer presented an altogether different ar-
gument from that of Schenck's counsel: "There is no constitutional
power in Congress over the subject of opinion, speech, and press.
...All control over speech and press is by the police power; all
172 See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S.
578 (1897).
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police power is in the states, none in the United States."' 17 3 This
argument was a literalist reading of the text of the first amend-
ment and reflected the ongoing debate about congressional powers
incident to the commerce clause 17 4 and the tax and spending
clause. 15 If successful, the argument would have served the news-
paper's immediate interests because it would have invalidated the
relevant portions of the Espionage Act. The argument did not pro-
vide much of a shield because Frohwerk's counsel seemed to be
willing to allow extensive state regulation. In this respect he simply
reflected the original understanding of first amendment rights. We
can only speculate whether in a state prosecution he would have
looked to the fourteenth amendment to incorporate the first for
substantive protection of speech through the liberty element of the
due process clause.
By comparison, the government's position was again a modified
reiteration of Blackstone-prior restraints were prohibited but
subsequent punishments were not.7 6 The Espionage Act provisions
on speech essentially amounted to a seditious libel statute. Profes-
sor Mayton has argued strenuously that the original Constitution
did away with seditious libel before the adoption of the Bill of
Rights. In his view the "overt act" requirement in the Treason
Clause'77 evidenced an intention to abolish the crime of sedition
and to allow punishment only for acts done in subversion of the
national security. 7 8 Whatever the merits of Mayton's argument,
that clearly was not the position of the Justice Department in
1919. To the contrary, the government argued that the first
amendment presented no bar to punishment for speech "generally
recognized as harmful, such as obscene, libelous, or seditious mat-
ter, or that which was deemed harmful according to common law
standards."'' 7
The Holmes opinion rejected on its face the argument of
173 Frohwerk, 63 L.Ed. at 562.
17, Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
178 The Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
176 Frohwerk, 63 L.Ed. at 563.
177 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3.
178 Mayton, supra note 20, at 257-59; Mayton, supra note 17, at 115-17.
179 Frohwerk, 63 L.Ed. at 563 (emphasis added).
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Frohwerk's counsel that the first amendment absolutely barred
federal action against speech. s Holmes went on to engage in a
detailed analysis of the contents of the articles and the circum-
stances surrounding their publication and distribution.18' Two con-
clusions were especially disturbing for advocates of greater press
and speech freedom. First, Holmes did not seek a standard of close
causal connection between a prohibited act and the speech in ques-
tion. To the contrary, he said that "it is impossible to say that it
might not have been found that the circulation of the paper was in
quarters where a little breath would be enough to kindle a flame
and that the fact was known and relied upon by those who sent the
paper out."'182 This standard was speculative, and suggested that
the greatest danger a speaker or publisher might face would be in
addressing those who wanted to hear his message. The only speech
clearly protected was that of the incompetent who addressed per-
sons who disagreed, but not violently,' with his message. Second,
Holmes said that a conspiracy to obstruct recruiting would be
criminal under the Espionage Act even if no means were agreed
upon or put into effect to accomplish the ends of the conspiracy.
The agreement was enough even without an overt act in further-
ance of the conspiracy. 8 4 This interpretation of the Espionage Act
transformed it into a twentieth century version of the eighteenth
century crime of seditious libel.
The third of the Holmes opinions in this set, Debs v. United
States,"5 sustained the conviction and long prison sentence1 86 of
the noted Socialist Eugene Victor Debs, who had been brought to
trial under the Espionage Act because of a public speech he made
on June 16, 1918, in Canton, Ohio. Debs spoke generally about the
virtues of socialism and the evils of capitalism. He criticized the
war effort as a means by which Wall Street capitalists sought to
180 The first amendment "cannot have been, and obviously was not, intended to give
immunity for every possible use of language." Frohwerk, 249 U.S. at 206.
181 Id. at 206-08.
162 Id. at 209.
'03 See, e.g., Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
184 Frohwerk, 249 U.S. at 209.
185 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
186 Debs was sentenced to ten years. He and others convicted under the Espionage Act
were pardoned by President Harding.
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subjugate the workers, and he praised those who had resisted the
draft for having the courage of their convictions. It was the sort of
speech that would cause hardly a ripple these days. But the convic-
tion was upheld because the Court, through Holmes, reasoned that
all the government had to show was that Debs was speaking about
World War I rather than war in general, that the natural effect and
intent was to stir up opposition to the war, and that opposition to
the war would make recruiting and the draft more difficult to ad-
minister.187 The arguments of counsel presented an interesting
point-counterpoint. In a brief amicus curiae for Debs, Gilbert E.
Roe argued that the Espionage Act could not be constitutionally
applied to "public discussion of public matters" or to punish "any
individual for speaking or publishing his opinions on any measures
of the government." '188 This was generally the position to be taken
later by Alexander Meiklejohn-that because free speech is essen-
tial to self-government there can be no restraints on "political
speech."18 By comparison the government argued that the Alien
and Sedition Laws of 1798 were constitutional and therefore that
the Espionage Act was constitutional. 90 Further, the government
reiterated the view that the first amendment was but a codification
of the common law.191
Schenck, Frohwerk and Debs were decided in March, 1919. By
November of that same year Holmes and Brandeis had changed
their minds, or perhaps just developed more clearly their under-
standings of the first amendment.1 92 Whatever happened, their
votes changed and they began to dissent from decisions sustaining
punishments for speech.
87 Debs, 249 U.S. at 214-15. Justice Holmes was willing to let the jury decide this issue
without a separate judicial review. Id. at 216. Since then, the Court has undertaken much
more extensive factual reviews in first amendment cases and has been generally unwilling to
allow too much jury independence. See Nagel, supra note 2.
'8 Debs, 63 L. Ed. at 567.
189 A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 112.
,90 Debs, 63 L. Ed. at 568.
'll Id. "The 1st Amendment was designed to preserve for the United States certain
existing and recognized constitutional liberties and not to create novel principles of law."
192 For an interesting discussion of the impact of Judge Learned Hand on Holmes, see
Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine: Some
Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REv. 719 (1975).
1986]
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
The first of these, Abrams v. United States,19 3 was as close to a
pure sedition prosecution as any case could be. A small group of
New York-based anarchists had printed and distributed circulars
(many were "distributed" by being thrown out windows) that pro-
tested the intervention of American troops in the Russian Revolu-
tion and that called upon their "fellow workers" to unite and re-
fuse to make munitions to be used against their Russian brothers.
There were the usual diatribes against capitalism and statements
to the effect that Germany and the United States were essentially
the same. Abrams was convicted under a 1918 amendment to the
Espionage Act for the publication of "disloyal, scurrilous and abu-
sive language about the form of Government of the United States"
that was "intended to bring the form of Government. . .into con-
tempt, scorn, contumely and disrepute. ' 194 The Supreme Court up-
held the convictions in an opinion by Justice Clarke.
In his dissent, 9 5 Holmes undertook a detailed content analysis
and concluded that the circulars were silly and insignificant. His
reasoning, when compared to that in Schenck, Frohwerk and Debs,
seemed to be that the anarchists involved in the Abrams case en-
joyed the right to protected speech, chiefly because they were such
an inconsequential and pitiful group that no one would pay much
attention to them. It was almost as if theirs was "speech that did
not matter" and therefore was entitled to constitutional safe-
guards. More importantly, the opinion contained Holmes' famous
"marketplace of ideas" justification for free speech. There have
been many criticisms of the "marketplace" approach, 96 but it was
the first time that a Supreme Court justice had articulated a justif-
icatory theory for a right of free speech that was neither textually
based (e.g., a portion of the "liberty" protected by the fourteenth
amendment) nor simply a restatement of custom or the common
law. Even so, Holmes did not break any new theoretical ground,
for his marketplace concept was but a modest restatement of the
19- 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
::4 Id. at 617.
"' Abrams, 250 U.S. at 624 (Holmes J., dissenting).
196 See, e.g. A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 112, at 73-77; W. BERNS, FREEDOM, VIRTUE AND
THE FiRsT AMENDMENT 170-73 (1957).
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work of John Milton'97 and John Stuart Mill.'98
The following year a case came before the Court that was virtu-
ally identical to Frohwerk. In Schaefer v. United States99 the ma-
jority sustained the Espionage Act convictions of three out of five
defendants in a case arising from the publication of articles in a
domestic German language newspaper that were critical of Ameri-
can involvement in World War I. Two convictions were reversed on
the facts. Justice McKenna, writing for the Court, employed rea-
soning almost the same as that used by Holmes in Schenck,
Frohwerk and Debs. The contents of the articles were examined in
the context of the circumstances. Even though the Court thought
that this type of factual analysis was properly in the province of
the jury, 00 the Court did, in fact, undertake its own review. Thus
the test, while factual in its formulation, edged toward that of a
legal standard which would allow a court to engage in a de novo
review.
Brandeis wrote the principal dissent in the Schaefer case, and he
was joined by Holmes.2 10 Justice Brandeis went directly to the
fact/law question. In his view, Schenck set forth a rule of reason
standard to be applied by both judge and jury to the facts and to
be subjected to factual review by the appellate court.20 2 In other
words, the Supreme Court justices could read the articles in ques-
tion and review the record of the circumstances surrounding their
publication and decide whether the rule of reason standard of
Schenck had been met, regardless of the jury's verdict. Although
this standard did not add anything by way of justification, it was a
more explicit step toward a legal, rather than a factual, standard
than the majority had been willing to take. Moreover, it suggested
a mechanism for at least greater certainty and predictability in
free speech matters, and it placed ultimate control in the hands of
197 J. MILTON, supra note 8.
lee J. MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859).
1' 251 U.S. 466 (1920).
200 Id. at 474.
201 Id. at 482 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Clarke also dissented, but he was con-
cerned about factual shortcomings in the government's case rather than legal issues. Id. at
495 (Clarke, J., dissenting).
202 Id. at 483.
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judges who were explicitly charged with the preservation of consti-
tutional values.20
3
A prominent Episcopal clergyman, the Rev. Irwin St. John
Tucker, was the central figure in the last of the major Espionage
Act cases, Pierce v. United States. °4 The Rev. Mr. Tucker had
written a pamphlet entitled "The Price We Pay," which was-as
were all the others at issue in these cases-critical of the war effort
and the draft. It was also moderately socialist in its political flavor.
The minister and his colleagues distributed the pamphlet and
made speeches on the same subjects. In upholding the convictions,
Justice Pitney backed away from the implications of the majority
decision in Schaefer and explicitly rejected Brandeis' dissenting
argument that appellate courts could and should review the factual
bases of jury verdicts in such cases.20 5
Once again joined by Holmes, Justice Brandeis20 6 republished
the pamphlet is ful 2 0 7 and used the Schaefer standard of appellate
review to analyze its content. Brandeis thought that the convic-
tions should be overturned on the facts, but he went on to outline
his own justification for the protection of speakers and publishers
such as the defendants in Pierce. Based on the premise that it was
the essential ingredient of a free government, Brandeis seemed to
203 See, e.g, Mayton, supra note 21, at 250-51 (role of judges); but cf., Hunter, Toward a
Better Understanding of the Prior Restraint Doctrine: A Reply to Professor Mayton, 67
CORNELL L. REV. 283, 288-92 (1982). Brandeis expressed a common fear of intolerant majori-
ties whose views might be reflected in the opinion of jurors. 251 U.S. at 494-95 (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting). Judges, however, might provide a counterbalance.
20 252 U.S. 239 (1920).
205
What interpretation ought to be placed on the pamphlet, what would be the
probable effect of distributing it in the mode adopted, and what were defendants'
motives in doing this, were questions for the jury, not the court, to decide . ..
Whether the printed words would in fact produce as a proximate result a mate-
rial interference with the recruiting or enlistment service, or the operation or suc-
cess of the forces of the United States, was a question for the jury to decide in
view of all the circumstances of the time, and considering the place and manner of
distribution.
Id. at 250.
206 Id. at 253 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
21 If nothing else, the de novo review standard does result in re-publications and
greater publicity.
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be moving toward an argument for the protection of political
speech:
The fundamental right of free men to strive for better con-
ditions through new legislation and new institutions will not
be preserved, if efforts to secure it by argument to fellow citi-
zens may be construed as criminal incitement to disobey the
existing law-merely because the argument presented seems
to those exercising judicial power to be unfair in its portrayal
of existing evils, mistaken in its assumptions, unsound in rea-
soning or intemperate in language. No objections more serious
than these can, in my opinion, reasonably be made to the ar-
guments presented in "The Price We Pay."20 s
The locus of discussion returned to the state level in Gilbert v.
Minnesota.20 9 In the zeal of patriotism, the Minnesota legislature
had passed a statute making it unlawful to teach or to advocate
that men should not enlist in the military service or aid the war
effort.210 Gilbert was convicted for making an anti-war speech at
the Non-Partisan League in Minneapolis on August 18, 1917, and
the conviction was upheld by the Court. In the majority opinion
Justice McKenna had little trouble with first amendment argu-
ments. McKenna reasoned that even conceding, arguendo, that
free speech was a "natural and inherent" right, it was not absolute
and could not be used against the United States in aid of its ene-
mies. 211 This reasoning displayed an abysmal absence of under-
standing of natural rights theory. Furthermore, he argued that the
nation was at war-and in his view justly so-therefore any criti-
cism of the war effort was properly subject to government cen-
sure.21 2 McKenna did not limit government power over speech to
"clear and present danger" circumstances, or to speech entangled
with acts. Rather, he adopted a broad view of government censor-
ship power little changed from the English laws of sedition.
200 Pierce, 252 U.S. at 273 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
2- 254 U.S. 325 (1920).
210 1917 Minn. Laws 764.
2"1 Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 332.
212 "It was not an advocacy of policies or a censure of actions that a citizen had the
right to make." Id. at 333.
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Interestingly, Holmes concurred in the result, although not in
the majority opinion.s 3 Perhaps his rule of reason analysis con-
vinced him of the correctness of the conviction. Chief Justice
White dissented because he believed the subject matter- national
security-to be exclusively a matter of federal concern and not a
proper subject of state police power regulation.214
The Brandeis dissent was his first extensive and explicit formu-
lation of a justification for speech protection.215 It deserves careful
consideration for the ways in which it is consistent with or differs
from the "marketplace of ideas" approach in Holmes' Abrams dis-
sent. Brandeis began by attacking the breadth and vagueness of
the statute. It applied, in his reading, to teaching that the abolition
of all war was possible and not just to comments about a particular
war, to teaching in peacetime and not just in emergency condi-
tions, and to teaching in places as private as the home and among
persons as intimately related as parents and children.218 Further-
more, the state law directly affected functions of the federal gov-
ernment and the privileges and immunities of American citizens as
American citizens and not as citizens of a particular state.17 Bran-
deis thus argued that free speech was a "privilege" of national citi-
zenship, and that the Minnesota law ran afoul of the privileges and
immunities clause of Article IV and of the fourteenth amend-
ment.21 s Minnesota had no business passing this law, according to
Brandeis, because both treason against the government and com-
ments on the functions of the federal government were matters
wholly within the authority of the national government to regu-
2I Id. at 334 (Holmes, J., concurring).
214 Id. at 334 (White, C.J., dissenting).
215 Id. at 334 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
211 Id. at 334-35.
21" Despite a number of arguments such as this by one or more members of the Court,
the privileges and immunities clause has been the basis for striking down only one state
law-a Vermont tax provision. See Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935). And, Colgate was
-overruled five years later in Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940). The seminal case, of
course, was the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
"' "The right to speak freely concerning functions of the Federal Government is a
privilege or immunity of every citizen of the United States which, even before the adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment, a State was powerless to curtail." Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 337
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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late.21 9 Brandeis argued that speech fell within the concept of "lib-
erty" protected by the fourteenth amendment,220 an argument that
echoed Harlan's opinion in Patterson v. Colorado. Finally, Bran-
deis restated even more strongly the political speech/self-govern-
ance theme that he had begun in Pierce:
Full and free exercise of this right by the citizen is ordinarily
also his duty; for its exercise is more important to the Nation
than it is to himself. Like the course of the heavenly bodies,
harmony in national life is a resultant of the struggle between
contending forces. In frank expression of conflicting opinion
lies the greatest promise of wisdom in governmental action.
and in suppression lies ordinarily the greatest peril.221
The Court returned to a consideration of congressional power
under the Postal Clause222 in United States ex rel. Milwaukee So-
cial Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson.223 In this case, the sec-
ond class postage privileges of a newspaper were revoked for the
publication of articles that were said to violate the Espionage Act.
There was an appeal process within the postal system which the
newspaper pursued all the way to the postmaster-general, who af-
firmed the revocation. The newspaper then petitioned for a writ of
mandamus to compel the postmaster-general to annul the revoca-
tion and to reinstate its second class permit. The petition was de-
nied, and the Supreme Court sustained the denial. This denial was
a disastrous result for the newspaper, because first class mailing
costs were prohibitive.
Counsel for the newspaper was clearly aware of the theoretical
debates about the scope of the first amendment. He argued that
there were two theories of free speech, one being that speech was
free after a prior review and censorship, the other being that
speech was free in the first instance but subject to post-speech
sanctions. In his view the American Constitution clearly adopted
the latter approach, and the denial of a second class permit was a
219 Id. at 334, 342.
220 Id. at 343.
2 Id. at 338.
222 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
223 255 U.S. 407 (1921).
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form of impermissible prior restraint.224 The government argued
for a causal connection test between speech and prohibited acts,
but the test suggested was one of minimal connection and was
hardly a reiteration of the clear and present danger standard: "Any
utterance whose natural effect is to retard or increase the difficul-
ties of the process of raising an army or navy adequate for a suc-
cessful prosecution of the war would constitute a violation of the
Espionage Law. '225
The majority, speaking through Justice Clarke, reasoned that
congressional power under the Postal Clause was plenary and that
Congress had full power to decide what was and was not "maila-
ble" and what could and could not be classified as first, second,
third class or some other category of mail. The exercise of this del-
egated power by the postmaster-general was not dangerous to
other rights because there were sufficient procedural safeguards
built into the system. 226 Finally, the majority concluded that the
complete revocation was permissible even though it related to fu-
ture mailings, because the newspaper had published offensive arti-
cles for five months and it was only "reasonable to conclude that it
would continue" to do so. 227 The articles were offensive because
they "were not designed to secure amendment or repeal" of laws
but "to create hostility to, and to encourage violation of, them. '228
Regulation was justified by reference to the government's implicit
right of self-preservation and the causal connection between the
content of the speech and the possibility of a prohibited act. It is
interesting to note that the Court did not demand a showing of
any actual connection or any imminent danger of an act. It was
enough that the words seemed intended to encourage disobedience.
Justice Brandeis filed a lengthy dissent 229 and adopted, in large
part, the argument of the newspaper's counsel that the postmaster-
general's decision was a form of prior censorship. The power to ex-
224 Milwaukee Social Democratic, 65 L. Ed. at 706.
222 Id.
226 Milwaukee Social Democratic, 255 U.S. at 410-12.
227 Id. at 416.
228 Id. at 414.
229 Id. at 417 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 35
FIRST AMENDMENT 1791-1930
clude delegated to the postmaster was the power to exclude mate-
rial determined in fact to be unmailable, and an exclusion order as
to a particular publication could only be reviewed for factual error.
In Brandeis' view, the postmaster did not possess the power to ex-
clude all mail presented "by a particular person, or the future is-
sues of a particular paper."230 That would turn the postmaster into
a censor, especially because the denial of mailing privileges was
tantamount to a denial of circulation.23 1 Brandeis was also troubled
by the use of the postal classification laws to enforce the Espionage
Act. If a publication were a newspaper as defined in the postal
laws, it was entitled to classification as one. If an article in the
newspaper violated the Espionage Act, then the government
should proceed under that Act.2 2 By using the postal power the
government was able to achieve its end of silencing the newspaper
without having to meet all the requirements of criminal due
process.
Brandeis did not confine his dissent to the first amendment con-
cerns of the newspaper. Indeed, he went much further and found
that the postmaster's action violated a substantial portion of the
entire Bill of Rights: (i) It violated the first amendment because it
amounted to prior censorship. (ii) It punished a publisher prior to
any due process (the review taking place only after the sanction) in
violation of the fifth amendment. (iii) It amounted to a severe pun-
ishment premised on a criminal violation of the Espionage Act,
and, therefore, was in contravention of the sixth amendment guar-
antee of trial by jury. (iv) The postmaster acted in a quasi-judicial
manner and thereby invaded the judicial powers granted by Article
III to the courts. (v) The denial of a civil right as a punishment
was highly unusual and violated the eighth amendment.233 In a fi-
nal, almost sarcastic, comment Brandeis threw substantive due
2 0 Id. at 421-22 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
:31 Id. at 423 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
32 "The fact that material appearing in a newspaper is unmailable under wholly differ-
ent provisions of law can have no effect on whether or not the publication is a newspaper.
Although it violates the law, it remains a newspaper. If it is a bad newspaper the act which
makes it illegal and not the Classification Act provides the punishment." Id. at 427 (Bran-
deis, J., dissenting).
233 Id. at 429-30 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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process back at the majority. If the Court considered the pursuit of
a lawful business to be within the "liberty" or "property" pro-
tected by the due process clause from government intrusion, then
this revocation clearly violated that right.I 4
The Milwaukee Social Democratic case did not include any sig-
nificant justificatory discussions, but it did assist in the clarifica-
tion of working theories and tests. The majority had retreated
from the "clear and present danger" standard but had maintained
the causal connection thread. Brandeis, and presumably Holmes,
had begun to articulate more clearly the prior restraint doctrine.
The Court had paid lip service to the prior restraint formulation,
but it had not done much to define what in fact actually consti-
tuted a prior restraint. Brandeis began the defnitional process, one
which continues to this day.235 Furthermore, Brandeis' opinion
contains the seeds of the idea that speech occupies an especially
favored position in the constitutional scheme. It is not something
that may be regulated without limitation as an incident of some
other activity that the government may in fact regulate. Accepting,
arguendo, the validity of Espionage Act limitations on speech, the
government could not silence an entire newspaper through another
law because of one article that might have violated the Espionage
Act.236
The next few years were fairly quiet so far as the Court and the
first amendment were concerned. In a 1922 case the Court again
refused to use the fourteenth amendment as an incorporation vehi-
cle by stating in dictum that "the Constitution of the United
States imposes upon the states no obligation to confer upon those
within their jurisdiction either the right of free speech or the right
of silence. 2 37 The Court employed substantive due process reason-
ing to dispose of first amendment issues suggested by three cases.
234 Id. at 432-33 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Holmes dissented separately. See id. at 436
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
'2 See, e.g., Hunter, supra note 190, at 292-95.
2136 "Congress may not, through its postal police power, put limitations upon the free-
dom of the press which if directly attempted would be unconstitutional." Milwaukee Social
Democratic, 255 U.S. at 430-31 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
237 Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 538 (1922).
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In Meyer v. Nebraska23 and Bartels v. Iowa 239 the Court struck
down state laws that prohibited or severely limited instruction in
foreign languages in the schools, private as well as public. These
statutes were said to violate the rights of teachers to pursue lawful
callings, of parents to make family decisions, of parents to contract
freely for the education of their children and of students to receive
information.240 Pierce v. Society of Sisters241 invalidated a state
law that mandated attendance at public schools because it effec-
tively destroyed private education. Although the sectarian nature
of many private schools introduced religious overtones, the Court's
rationale was based on substantive due process concerns about oc-
cupations and family autonomy. 242
In 1925 there was a significant change in the Supreme Court's
treatment of first amendment cases. For the first time the Court
specifically stated that the freedoms protected by the first were
within the "liberty" protected by the fourteenth. This, of course,
meant that state laws could be judged directly against first amend-
ment standards without resort to more nebulous substantive due
process concepts. It also opened the door to many more first
amendment cases. Justice Sanford, writing for the Court in Gitlow
v. New York,243 stated the new standard with little discussion and
with virtually no note of the longstanding federalism arguments
against incorporation: 44
For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of
speech and of the press-which are protected by the First
Amendment from abridgement by Congress-are among the
fundamental personal rights and "liberties" protected by the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from im-
pairment by the states. We do not regard the incidental state-
ment in Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek ... that the Fourteenth
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
229 262 U.S. 404 (1923).
1,0 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401. See generally Hunter, supra note 140, at 4-7.
241 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
242 For a discussion of Pierce in the context of family law, see Developments in the
Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156 (1980).
243 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
2" See, e.g., Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907).
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Amendment imposes no restrictions on the states concerning
freedom of speech, as determinative of this question.245
Despite the incorporation of the first amendment, the Court up-
held the constitutionality of New York's criminal anarchy stat-
utes 246 as applied in the case of Benjamin Gitlow, a member of the
Left Wing section of the Socialist Party, who was prosecuted for
the publication of various socialist writings. The Court agreed that
"there was no evidence of any effect" resulting from the publica-
tions,247 but the Court sustained Gitlow's conviction because the
writings-analyzed at length by the Court-could be said to "ad-
vocate" various illegal acts. The statute, as interpreted by the New
York courts, punished advocacy as opposed to discussion or
description, and this punishment the Court found to be
permissible:
That a state in the exercise of its police power may punish
those who abuse this freedom [of speech] by utterances inimi-
cal to the public welfare, tending to corrupt public morals,
incite to crime, or disturb the public peace, is not open to
question. . .. [The first amendment] does not protect publi-
cations or teachings which tend to subvert or imperil the gov-
ernment, or to impede or hinder it in the performance of its
governmental duties. . .. In short, this freedom does not de-
prive a state of the primary and essential right of self-preser-
vation, which, so long as human governments endure, they
cannot be denied. 248
Holmes, joined by Brandeis, dissented,249 and in one of his most
famous opinions, Holmes outlined the scope of his speech theory
and its necessary implications. First, Holmes restated the clear and
present danger test as he had enunciated it in Schenck. He con-
ceded that the opinions of the Court in Abrams and Schaefer
could be understood as modifications of the Schenck test, but he
245 Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 666. The Prudential case had been decided in 1922 by virtually
the same Court.
:4 N.Y. Penal Laws 1909 §§ 160, 161.
247 268 U.S. at 656.
248 Id. at 667-68.
241 Id. at 672 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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believed that the "clear and present danger" standard had sur-
vived.2 50 The evidence in the Gitlow case did not support a finding
of a clear and present danger in the view of Justice Holmes, be-
cause there was no evidence of any ill effect from the speech. De-
spite Holmes' attempt to resuscitate the clear and present danger
test, the "bad tendency" standard of the majority was a radical
departure from Holmes' formula in Schenck. The Holmes dissent,
however, was more than a call to return to the clear and present
danger standard of Schenck. It was at once an eloquent defense of
free speech and also a chilling statement of the results that could
follow:
It is said that this Manifesto was more than a theory, that it
was an incitement. Every idea is an incitement. It offers itself
for belief and if believed it is acted on unless some other be-
lief outweighs it or some failure of energy stifles the move-
ment at its birth. The only difference between the expression
of an opinion and an incitement in the narrower sense is the
speaker's enthusiasm for the result. Eloquence may set fire to
reason. But whatever may be thought of the redundant dis-
course before us it had no chance of starting a present confla-
gration. If in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian
dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the dominant
forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is
that they should be given their chance and have their way.
If the publication of this document had been laid as an at-
tempt to induce an uprising against government at once, and
not at some indefinite time in the future it would have
presented a different question. The object would have been
one with which the law might deal, subject to the doubt
whether there was any danger that the publication could pro-
duce any result, or, in other words, whether it was not futile
and too remote from possible consequences. But the indict-
ment alleges the publication and nothing more.
251
The clear and present danger test may protect a much broader
area of speech than the bad tendency test, but the two share a
250 Id. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
251 Id. (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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common failing if the goal is to maximize the protection of speech.
They both allow the punishment of speech separate and apart
from acts. There is a difference between punishing speech that is
part and parcel of an illegal act (e.g., the words necessary to the
commission of a crime of fraud) or speech that is itself defined as
criminal (e.g., obscene speech, although there are plenty of
problems with that as well) and punishing speech that may be con-
nected to a separate unlawful act, whether imminently connected
or more distantly related252. In this regard, the clear and present
danger test and the bad tendency test are not fundamentally dif-
ferent. The Holmes test is more sensitive to speech concerns, to be
sure, but it is not as sensitive as the arguments of those who say,
for instance, that the Constitution only allows punishment for acts,
that government may not punish speech at least to the extent that
"speech" is a defined constitutional term.253
In his Gitlow dissent Holmes seemed to be suggesting that Ben-
jamin Gitlow should not be punished because he was an ineffective
publisher. No one paid him any mind. Therein lies another diffi-
culty with the Schenck test-it reserves the greatest protection for
those who make the least impact. Those who are eloquent may find
that the first amendment offers little comfort. When protection is
most needed, it might not be there, and a constitutional protection
that varies with the effectiveness and eloquence of a speech or
publication seems odd at best.
The suggestion that free speech mandates the acceptance of
"proletarian dictatorship" if that is "to be accepted by the 4omi-
nant forces of the community" is especially troubling. Holmes did
not reject explicitly the self-preservation argument of the majority,
but a proletarian dictatorship would have done away with the
American democracy as then in existence. If freedom of speech
means that such a result must be accepted, then, to be consistent,
212 For a comprehensive study of the problems in more recent cases, see Greenawalt,
Speech and Crime, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 645.
213 The Court's greatest proponent of total protection for "pure" speech was Justice
Black. Black's literalist reading of the first amendment was the apotheosis of legal positiv-
ism, at least in that limited area. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
293 (1964) (Black, J., concurring); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 268 (1952) (Black,
J., dissenting). See also, Mayton, supra note 17.
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Holmes should have abandoned the clear and present danger test
to the extent that it relied upon a government preservation justifi-
cation. It might have still applied in connection with attempts to
protect public health and safety, but not to protect the form of
government. This portion of his opinion also raises questions about
Holmes' commitment to the "marketplace of ideas." The justifica-
tion for his marketplace approach was that it was the best means
to the end of truth. If the ultimate goal is truth, what then of a
dictatorship that not only changes the form of government, but
also redefines truth to suit the new political order and establishes a
different way to reach that goal?
Holmes was no doubt optimistic that the mutterings of Ameri-
can socialists, communists and anarchists would never carry the
day. He said as much in Abrams. But Holmes was also a skeptic
and he was reluctant to make an a priori determination about the
value of Abrams' speech. The skeptic in Holmes was willing to run
the risk that the "marketplace" might approve results that he
found unpalatable. The marketplace theory still failed to justify,
and did not always identify, the end to be achieved-and it did not
clearly connect speech to that end. Was speech simply an instru-
ment, a means? Or did it have a separate life as itself "truth" in
process? Was the "marketplace of ideas" nothing more than a
formula for nihilistic relativism? Despite the many questions
raised by the Gitlow dissent, ably noted by commentators over the
years,254 this opinion did begin to round out a comprehensive ap-
proach to the adjudication of speech cases. After many years of
fumbling, two members of the Court were coming to grips with the
theoretical problems of speech and democracy. The majority con-
tinued to be mired in its limited exploration of the Blackstone
model, although the Court had occasionally embraced a speech in-
terest in its rather lavish approach to substantive due process.
Two years later, in Whitney v. California,255 the Court unani-
mously sustained a conviction under California's criminal syndical-
254 See, e.g., Rogat, The Judge as Spectator, 31 U. CHL L. REV. 213 (1964); A.
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 48 (1948); Mendelson,
Clear and Present Danger-From Schenck to Dennis, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 313 (1952).
255 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
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ism statute256 for "assisting in organizing. . . the Communist La-
bor Party of California, of being a member of it, and of assembling
with it. '2 57 The majority, speaking again through Justice Sanford,
reiterated the "bad tendency" test as set forth in Gitlow. The ma-
jority also deferred to the wisdom of the California legislature in
deciding through the legislative process what did and did not
amount to a bad tendency.2 8
Brandeis, joined by Holmes, concurred 259 in the judgment be-
cause the principal constitutional issues had not been properly
raised in the trial court and therefore were not reviewable on ap-
peal.2 0 Although they could not vote to set Miss Whitney free, the
two concurring justices fundamentally disagreed with the rationale
of the majority. What is intriguing is that the Brandeis formula-
tion of a theory of free speech was substantially different from that
as articulated by Holmes in Abrams and Gitlow. Brandeis wrote:
Those who won our independence believed that the final end
of the state was to make men free to develop their faculties;
and that in its government the deliberative forces should pre-
vail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end
and as a means. . .. They believed that freedom to think as
you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to
the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free
speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with
them, discussion afforded ordinarily adequate protection
against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the great-
est menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discus-
sion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental
principle of the American government .. . ; the path of
safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed griev-
ances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for
evil: counsels is good ones. Believing in the power of reason as
applied through public discussion, they eschewed silence co-
erced by law-the argument of force in its worst form. Recog-
nizing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, they
256 Calif. Stats. 1919, Ch. 188, p. 281.
21' Whitney, 274 U.S. at 373 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
258 Id. at 371-72 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
21, Id. at 372 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
260 Id. at 380 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
[Vol. 35
FIRST AMENDMENT 1791-1930
amended the Constitution so that free speech and assembly
should be guaranteed. 26 1
This passage evidences much of the same rationalism that
Holmes displayed in his marketplace formula. There is the idea
that if the information is available, reason will ultimately prevail,
and reason will lead to liberty as well as to justice.262 But Brandeis
had a safety valve in his formula that was not present in the
Holmes opinions. Brandeis tied free speech to the end of self-gov-
ernment, which is itself tied to the end of individual liberty. Al-
though this liberty may not be unrestrained,63 the interconnected-
ness of speech, liberty and self-government provides not only a
matrix for the protection of speech but also for the preservation of
the form of government that makes possible individual liberty and
free speech. Speech is not just a matter of laissez faire exchanges.
Instead it is the critical element in, and is itself protected by, a
political system of self-government, and a particular form of self-
government at that-one that recognizes the importance of the in-
dividual even as against the main currents of community values.
During the remaining two terms in the twenties there was only
one case of any consequence that touched upon first amendment
issues. In United States v. Schwimmer 64 the Supreme Court up-
held the denial of an application for naturalization by a Hungarian
pacifist who refused to swear that she would take up arms in de-
fense of the United States. In all other respects she was conceded
to be an excellent candidate for citizenship, and as a middle-aged
woman the chances of her being called upon to serve in the mili-
tary were decidedly slim. Nevertheless, she argued that she could
not in good conscience take the oath of allegiance to the Constitu-
tion because it contained a clause that could be construed to be an
affirmation of the validity of military action. The .Court ruled that
Congressional power over naturalization was plenary; that an alien
261 Id. at 375-76 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
262 "Men feared witches and burned women. It is the function of speech to free men
from the bondage of irrational fears." Id. at 376 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
260 He reiterated the clear and present danger test and noted that the state is responsi-
ble for protecting citizens from harm. Id. at 375-76 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
264 279 U.S. 644 (1929).
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did not have a right to become a citizen, and that an application
for citizenship could be conditioned by whatever provisions Con-
gress might enact so long as there was some rational basis for the
conditions. Justice Butler, writing for the Court, said: "[t]hat it is
the duty of citizens by force of arms to defend our government
against all enemies whenever necessity arises is a fundamental
principle of the Constitution. '265 Butler's view of a citizen's duty
was consistent with the argument that the government has a right
of self-preservation that justifies regulation of forms and content of
expression.
In dissent, Holmes went to the heart of the free speech issue.26
Leaving aside the question of the rights of an alien as opposed to
those of a citizen, the central theme of the Holmes opinion was
that the condition being imposed upon Miss Schwimmer was in-
consistent with the fundamental precepts of American democracy.
She was being denied the opportunity to apply for citizenship be-
cause she insisted on the freedom to'believe what she pleased-the
freedom that was, in Holmes' view, the sine qua non of our consti-
tutional democracy. By insisting upon being an American in her
beliefs she was being denied the opportunity to become one in fact:
[I]f there is any principle of the Constitution that more im-
peratively calls for attachment than any other it is the princi-
ple of free thought-not free thought for those who agree
with us but freedom for the thought that we hate. I think that
we should adhere to that principle with regard to admission
into, as well as to life within, this country.267
This brief passage echoes the arguments that Holmes had begun
to make a decade earlier. Free speech or free thought was neither
just a phrase in the Constitution nor simply a liberty interest
under the fourteenth amendment. In the Holmes scheme it had
become the mechanism necessary to the attainment of truth
(Abrams) or, as here, to the preservation of the American constitu-
tional democracy, an approach that anticipated the Meiklejohn ar-
28 Id. at 650.
288 Id. at 653 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justice Brandeis joined the Holmes dissent.
217 Id. at 654-55 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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guments. 68 In his recognition of freedom "for the thought that we
hate" Holmes remained true to the logic of his argument in Git-
low.2"' Because Holmes emphasized that Schwimmer was a fiftyish
woman who would never be called to military duty and who would
be highly unlikely to stir up trouble were the nation to face an-
other war, it remains impossible to be wholly satisfied with his dis-
sent. There is the lingering suspicion that Holmes may have been
swayed because Miss Schwimmer was a respectable, civilized wo-
man whose speech and thoughts on pacifism probably would not
cause any disruptions or disturbances. Hers was speech similar to
that at issue in the Abrams and Gitlow cases-speech that really
mattered very little.
The year 1930 was a watershed for the Supreme Court in the
area of free speech. Charles Evans Hughes, who had served as an
associate justice from 1910-1916 before an unsuccessful attempt at
the presidency, returned to the Court as Chief Justice. In that
same year, Justice Sanford was replaced by Owen Roberts. Within
one term, the new Chief Justice was able to put together a majority
consisting of himself, Holmes, Brandeis, Stone270 and Roberts that
was generally sympathetic to first amendment claims. Although
this new majority was not always consistent and was roundly criti-
cized from time to time, the new alignments did mean that the
Holmes and Brandeis dissents from 1919-1929 began to be woven
into the majority opinions.
Twice in 1930 the Court considered applications for naturaliza-
tion that were essentially identical to the circumstances in
Schwimmer. In these two cases 271 the new Chief Justice was unable
to muster a majority to overturn Schwimmer, and the applicants
were denied the opportunity to become citizens. 2  But in
268 See A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 112.
269 See supra text accompanying notes 241-46.
270 Harlan F. Stone replaced Justice McKenna in 1925.
271 United States v. McIntosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1930); United States v. Bland, 283 U.S.
636 (1930).
272 Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone joined the dissent. In his opinion for the
Court in McIntosh, Justice Sutherland set out a chilling view of government powers in war
time:
To the end that war may not end in defeat, freedom of speech may, by act of
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Stromberg v. California,27 3 an individual who had been punished
for a form of political expression finally won the day. Stromberg, a
nineteen year old girl who was a member of the Young Communist
League, had displayed the red flag at a summer camp in California
where she was a counselor. She was convicted of violating a state
law that forbade the display of a red flag because it was a symbol
of opposition to organized government, an aid to anarchy, and an
aid to seditious propaganda. The conviction was overturned, and
the Chief Justice's majority opinion reworked the themes devel-
oped by Holmes and Brandeis.
First, Hughes conceded that the state could punish "utterances
which incite to violence and crime and threaten the overthrow of
organized government by unlawful means. ' 27 4 Although this stan-
dard was not identical to the "clear and present danger" formula-
tion, the two standards shared the requirement of a direct causal
nexus between speech and unlawful action. The Hughes incitement
standard was also considerably more restrictive than the "bad ten-
dency" test established by the Gitlow majority opinion.
Hughes went on to state a more comprehensive view of the
meaning of free speech:
The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discus-
sion to the end that government may be responsive to the will
of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful
means, an opportunity essential to the security of the Repub-
lic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system.27 5
Congress, be curtailed or denied so that the morale of the people and the spirit of
the army may not be broken by seditious utterances; freedom of the press cur-
tailed to preserve our military plans and movements from the knowledge of the
enemy; deserters and spies put to death without indictment or trial by jury; ships
and supplies requisitioned; property of alien enemies theretofore under the pro-
tection of the Constitution seized without process and converted to the public use
without compensation and without due process of law in the ordinary sense of
that term; prices of food and other necessities of life fixed or regulated; railways
taken over and operated by the government; and other drastic powers, wholly
inadmissible in time of peace, exercised to meet the emergencies of war.
McIntosh, 283 U.S. at 622.
2-1 283 U.S. 359 (1930).
274 Id. at 368-69.
2175 Id. at 369.
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In this passage, Hughes managed to tie free speech and self-gov-
ernment together in the same matrix, making each dependent on
the other. He also noted the pragmatic utility of speech as a means
for venting anger lawfully and therefore in a manner conducive to
public security. The Hughes formula was not the open-ended mar-
ketplace of ideas posited by Holmes in which arguments were to
have free play in a laissez-faire system. Instead, his approach was
much more along the lines of Brandeis' opinion in the Whitney
case in which individual liberty interests in speech were said to be
integral to the form of democratic government and vice versa. One
was the predicate for the other.
The next major first amendment case before the Court was the
famous prior restraint decision in Near v. Minnesota. This pre-
saged a new era of Supreme Court lawmaking on free speech issues
and provides a convenient stopping point for a review and consid-
eration of the development of a theory of the first amendment to
1930.
IV. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON THE FIRST 140 YEARS
Frankly, the Supreme Court developed comparatively little juris-
prudence regarding the role of the first amendment in the period
from 1791 to 1930. There were few cases until 1919. The Court's
opinions were sketchy and usually hostile to the speech interests
that were asserted. Until the return of Charles Evans Hughes to
the Court as Chief Justice, the success rate for defendants in
speech-based prosecutions was nil. A stranger who tried to deter-
mine the level of tolerance for speech, for the press, and for reli-
gion who read nothing but Supreme Court opinions well might
have concluded that American society was repressive, intolerant,
and prudish.
There were two major themes running through the cases well
into the 1920s. First, the Court explicitly understood the first
amendment to be a slightly Americanized restatement of Black-
stone's concept of the liberty of speech and press. This under-
2.76 283 U.S. 697 (1930).
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standing meant that any duly passed law came into Court with a
presumption of validity so long as its sanctions were applied after
the fact. In the Blackstonian scheme of things, there was simply no
infringement of liberty if there was no prior restraint.2 A law
could be examined for arbitrariness, for compliance with due pro-
cess requirements and so on, but the presumption of validity cast a
heavy burden of proof on an individual defendant. This under-
standing essentially reduced the first amendment to an election of
remedies device.
Second, there was a strong current of federalism. The first
amendment was inapplicable to the states until the Court rather
cavalierly incorporated it through the fourteenth amendment in
the 1925 Gitlow decision. In regard to federalism, the first amend-
ment was treated no differently from many other parts of the Con-
stitution and Bill of Rights. Interestingly, the liberties of speech,
press and religion were never included within the "liberty" pro-
tected by the fourteenth amendment through the mechanism of
substantive due process.278 Speech and religious interests did re-
ceive some incidental protection through due process concerns for
the "liberty" to pursue a chosen occupation, 7 9 the "liberty" to
make a contract, 280 and the "liberty" to raise a family.2 '
Another point that the Court left largely unexplored, and that
continues to be unexplored to this day, was the scope of state po-
lice powers. Certainly the states retained police powers over mat-
ters of public health, safety, and morals, but did this include the
power to regulate speech that was "seditious?" For the most part,
the Court accepted without comment the assertion of state power
to regulate seditious speech. Chief Justice White was a notable ex-
ception. He dissented in Gilbert v. Minnesota,282 a state prosecu-
tion based on a Minnesota law prohibiting the advocacy of draft
resistance, because he considered national security to be a matter
277 This is an extremely short sighted argument. See Hunter, supra note 190, at 292-95.
278 Justice Harlan thought they were incorporated by the fourteenth amendment. Pat-
terson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 464 (1907) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
7 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)
280 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
281 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
282 254 U.S. 325, 334 (1920) (White, C.J., dissenting).
[Vol. 35
FIRST AMENDMENT 1791-1930
for exclusive federal action. A careful reading of the original Con-
stitution could lead to the conclusion that White was correct. The
Constitution gives the federal government sole control of foreign
affairs, including commerce,283 immigration,284 foreign exchange
rates,28 5 piracies on the High Seas, offenses against international
law,286 and war.2 s7 The states are prohibited explicity from engag-
ing in any kind of foreign relation on their own account. 8 Perhaps
the two most significant provisions are the treason clause 289 and
the guarantee of a republican form of government.290 Taken to-
gether, these indicate an intention to vest exclusive responsibility
for the security of the nation and of the various states in the fed-
eral government. If this interpretation is correct, there is a good
argument for the proposition that the only government with an in-
terest to protect against the dangers of sedition is the federal gov-
ernment, and, if Professor Mayton's arguments are correct, sedi-
tion was defined out of existence as a crime by the treason
clause.2 1 According to Professor Kalven, the first amendment ac-
complished the same objective because "the core of its constitu-
tional protection must be to guard against treating seditious libel
as an offence. ' 292 This is not the place to enter into a lengthy con-
sideration of this point. It is enough to note that the question, al-
though mentioned, was never seriously addressed by the Supreme
Court, and this silence left the states with a broad range of un-
charted authority to regulate political speech as well as speech that
fell within the normal area of police power concerns.
Beginning with Justice Harlan's dissent in the Patterson v. Colo-
rado case, some members of the Court did begin to develop a
sketchy jurisprudence of the first amendment that had its roots in
English utilitarianism with overlays of American pragmatism and
13 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
284 Id. at cl. 4.
28 Id. at cl. 5.
286 Id. at cl. 10.
287 Id. at c1. 11.
288 Id. at § 10, cl. 3.
289 Id. at art. III, § 3.
2I Id. at art. IV, § 4.
'9, Mayton, supra note 17, at 115, 141.
2192 H. KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRsT AMENDMENT 59 (1965).
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rudimentary sociological consequentialism. Harlan, and later
Holmes and Brandeis, did not proceed from an individualist, liber-
tarian perspective, although their arguments were not insensitive
to libertarian values. Nor did they proceed from a structural or
textual perspective. Instead they focused on certain ends that were
more or less defined and that were identified as valuable. Freedom
of speech was justified as a means for the achievement of those
ends. This "instrumentalist" approach is subject to a number of
criticisms. How are the ends identified and justified? What hap-
pens if a better or more efficient means is identified? Nevertheless,
this approach does provide a mechanism for the protection of a
wide range of speech so long as judges assume a high value for
speech as a means for the achievement of certain desired ends,
such as truth or self-government.
Brandeis advanced a somewhat more sophisticated justificatory
theory by tying speech and self-government together as mutually
dependent conditions. The Brandeis approach was different from
Meiklejohn's later argument in that Meiklejohn posited self-gov-
ernment as an end to which free speech was a necessary means.
Brandeis seemed to define self-government in terms of speech.
Self-government and individual liberty did not exist without lib-
erty of speech. Speech was not an instrument for the achievement
of self-government but was a central part of self-government. The
Court refrained from determining whether freedom of speech could
exist in a society that was not self-governed, although the implica-
tion was that it could not.2 93 The Brandeis formula suffered from a
certain circularity and it tended to be more descriptive than nor-
mative, albeit with a heavy dose of assumed values. The impor-
tance of Brandeis' formulation lies in the integration of speech into
his theory of political democracy. The greatest criticism of a purely
instrumentalist approach from a libertarian perspective is that the
"instrument" may be manipulated to serve a variety of ends. Bran-
deis was not as clear about what he was doing as one might prefer,
293 Some aspects of freedom of expression have thrived in non-democratic societies. Ac-
ademic freedom was a strong tradition in German universities despite the autocratic govern-
ment. See W. VAN HUMBOLDT, THE SPHERE AND DUTIES OF GOVERNMENT (1854); Nisbet, Max
Weber and the Roots of Academic Freedom, in CONTROVERSIES AND DECISIONS 103, 106-10,
119-20 (C. Frankel ed. 1976).
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but he avoided this criticism by making speech integral to the con-
cept of self-government. Meiklejohn might have been heading in
this direction, but in his argument speech still emerges more as a
means than it is in Brandeis' formula, at least as set out in the
Whitney opinion.
The end identified by Holmes, "truth," arguably provided a ba-
sis for the protection of a wider range of speech. By tying speech
and self-government so closely together, Brandeis, like Meiklejohn,
developed a justificatory scheme for "political" speech that did not
necessarily include the arts, science or other "non-political"
speech. The search for "truth," by comparison, opens a wide door.
Professor Rabban ascribes to Brandeis a more rights-oriented
viewpoint.29 4 In support of his argument Rabban cites extensively
from the private papers of Brandeis and also notes the civil liber-
tarian interests of Brandeis before he joined the Court.2 95 It may
be that Brandeis was, at heart, sympathetic to rights theories and
that he had been heavily influenced by Locke and Hobbes. But in
his published Supreme Court opinions, his justificatory rationales
do not fit within either the natural law or the Kantian tradition.
They may have a "rights" result, and there may be some indica-
tions of a preference for a rights-based jurisprudence. The ratio-
nales, however, are much closer to the mainstream of utilitarian
and consequentialist thought. Placing Brandeis in the utilitarian
rather than natural rights school really should not be surprising.
Every law student is introduced early on to the "Brandeis brief"
with its emphasis on facts and context. Brandeis also shared the
skepticism of the "progressives" about substantive due process,
and was naturally reluctant to follow a line that might lead him to
a position consistent with Lochner. There is little question about
Holmes. He is even included in a well-known anthology of pragma-
tist writings alongside William James and John Dewey.196
Brandeis, and Holmes to a lesser extent, were among the
"progressives." The political focus of the progressives was on social
294 Rabban, supra note 18, at 1332-45.
295 Id.
191 THE AMERICAN PRAGMATISTS (M. Konvitz and G. Kennedy eds. 1960).
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reform through legislation. They were exponents of the classic
American dream that problems exist to be solved by common
sense, science or technology. Social inequalities could be "fixed" by
appropriate legislative action if proper empirical studies provided
an adequate data basis for reasoned analysis. Holmes' writings dis-
played a stronger sense of Social Darwinism-his marketplace of
ideas is an example-but Brandeis was clearly of the reform tradi-
tion interested in promoting social and economic equality.297 Liber-
tarian ideas were not predominant among this group. Indeed, there
was something of a negative connotation associated with liberta-
rian arguments among the progressives because of the use of "lib-
erty" in the substantive due process cases to strike down reform
legislation favored by the progressives. 98
Holmes and Brandeis continued to accept the basic validity of
governmental restraints, despite their developing interests in pro-
tecting speech. They did not question the power of the federal gov-
ernment to pass the Espionage Act or the power of New York to
enact a criminal anarchy statute. Instead, they focused on the ap-
plication of those laws in specific cases by balancing the govern-
ment's interest in regulating certain kinds of activities against an
individual's interest in speech that might be causally connected
with a future antisocial act. The "clear and present danger test"
might have been speech protective, but it was a balancing test and
thus subject to the variations of any balancing test.29
Perhaps the single most noteworthy aspect of the cases through
1930, especially those from 1919 forward, was the extraordinary at-
tention paid to context. Holmes was unpersuaded that Abrams
presented a "clear and present danger" to the republic because he
and his band were insignificant and unimportant. Likewise, he was
not worried about admitting Miss Schwimmer to the United States
because she was a middle aged woman who would not be subject to
2'97 See generally Rabban, supra note 18, at 1332-45; P. MURPHY, THE MEANING OF
FREEDOM OF SPEECH: FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOMS FROM WILSON TO FDR (1972) (a study of
the interpreters and interpretations of the term "freedom of speech" from 1918 to 1933).
29 The Holmes dissent in Meyer is a good example. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
412 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
219 That was the central theme of Meildejohn's criticism. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra
note 112, at 73-77.
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the draft. Her pacifism was quaint, tea party pacifism, not aggres-
sive, demonstrative pacifism that might cause real difficulties for
military recruiters. The opinions were invariably riddled with fac-
tual references. The arguments for protecting speech thus were
tied closely to the circumstances surrounding the speech. Speaking
was not simply an expression of a liberty interest, nor simply a
means of self-fulfillment. Speech was a social event. Its degree of
constitutional protection depended upon the community and the
context and not simply upon the identity of the speaker or the
content of the speech.
The concern with context placed Holmes and Brandeis squarely
in the tradition of American pragmatism.300 The important ques-
tions were those of consequences. Speech was not a liberty in the
libertarian, natural rights sense. To the contrary, free speech was a
value to be weighed together with other values derived from norms
of justice and equality as well as liberty. This weighing process
could only take place within a particularized factual context. Thus,
each case had to stand or fall on its own merits.
In this scenario, the libertarian approach to government power
has little meaning. By accepting the existence of government.
power and weighing a variety of interests, the "pragmatic utilita-
rian" necessarily accepts the government as an instrument for the
vindication and preservation of individual and community values.
The communitarian values may be different from individual values
in speech, but in this calculus they are to be balanced together.
Taken by itself, Holmes' "marketplace of ideas" argument, while
instrumentalist in tone, might seem to be libertarian in effect, but
Holmes never really separated the "marketplace of ideas" from the
"clear and present danger" test. The latter assumes that the gov-
ernment has both a power and a duty to preserve the peace, as well
0oo I refer to that school of thought best exemplified by writers such as William James
and John Dewey. There are roots in English utilitarianism and in the transcendentalism of
Ralph Waldo Emerson, and the tradition continues in the writings of many lawyers and
judges, as well as historians such as Henry Steele Commager. There was a strong element of
pragmatism in the work of Charles Frankel who devoted much of his life to relating the
theoretical work of humanists to the practical world of public policy-making. See, e.g., C.
FRANKEL, THE CASE FOR MODERN MAN (1955), THE DEMOCRATIC PROSPECT (1957), and THE
LovE OF ANXIETY (1965).
1986]
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
as itself, as the mechanism for the protection of the values impor-
tant to the community, including freedom of speech.30 1
The net result was that by 1930 there existed a nascent jurispru-
dence of the first amendment. Professor Rabban is generally cor-
rect in his analysis of pre-World War I cases, for most assertions of
speech interests met with judicial intolerance or indifference. 2 On
the other hand, Holmes, Brandeis, and Hughes did not write on a
tabula rasa. There were precedents and among them was an occa-
sional speech-protective opinion. What is most striking about the
Holmes and Brandeis opinions, however, is that they did not form
the basis for any new libertarian theory of speech, nor were they a
resurrection of the framers' supposed libertarian sentiments (if the
framers were libertarians at all, an issue about which there is much
debate). To the contrary, the underlying philosophy of Holmes and
Brandeis did not break any new ground at all. They changed the
methodological, but not the theoretical, approach. Speech was use-
ful and should be accorded a high value in the sorting out of com-
peting interests. That is essentially what Holmes and Brandeis
said, regardless of what commentators may have attributed to
them. This formula is one that is affirmatively pragmatic because
pragmatism is less a philosophy than a methodology: because
speech works, it is valuable, therefore the presumption should be
in its favor and against regulation. Such a methodology was not an
approach designed to satisfy those seeking a normative justifica-
tory theory, but it was useful in protecting large areas of human
expression from governmental interference. Speakers, even the
publishers of scurrilous materials, began to have hope that they
might win in battles against the government.
Finally, one is left with some uncertainty about the impact judi-
cial decisions had on "speech that matters." Overt government
hostility had not stopped the labor movement; it had not silenced
301 This failure to distinguish between the two tests creates an inconsistency in that it
leaves one unclear about values. If the "free trade in ideas" leads to a proletarian dictator-
ship because the marketplace defines that as the road to truth, then what becomes of the
clear and present danger test? Following the marketplace will destroy the government. Is
that permissible or desirable? If the government can intervene to protect itself, then doesn't
that place an outer limit on the freedom of the marketplace?
302 Rabban, supra note 18, at 523-24, 557-59.
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critics of war and capitalism such as Eugene Victor Debs; the
movie industry grew enormously fast; and no one could question
the vitality of the literary arts in the twenties. Scholarly commen-
tary was much more advanced in the development of arguments
for the protection of speech, and some scholars even described
Court opinions in ways that were probably more liberal than the
draftsmen intended.303 Nevertheless, judicial opinions set a tone
that affected the actions of prosecutors, lower court judges, and
even legislatures.
The inclusion of speech within the liberties protected by sub-
stantive due process would no doubt have had a profound effect
upon the enforcement of the Espionage Act, and might well have
changed the nature of the debate about speech to one that would
be fought out on libertarian grounds rather than on norms derived
from utilitarian and pragmatic arguments. Even if we were to ac-
cept Professor Nagel's argument that judicial review does not re-
sult in systemic protection of speech, 0 4 most would no doubt agree
that more sensitive judicial attitudes during the first 140 years of
the Republic's existence would have assisted in the fuller develop-
ment of speech and press freedoms.
The instrumentalist arguments of Holmes and Brandeis should
not be dismissed as bloodless methodological approaches subject to
clever manipulation by result-oriented judges. Pragmatism may
not satisfy the desire for timeless norms, but it is not valueless.
Professor Henry Steele Commager, writing in the American prag-
matic tradition, has argued strongly to the contrary.305 At the core
of pragmatism, according to Commager, is the attempt to discover
truth. Citing William James, he wrote:
[t]he pragmatic method . . . starts from the postulate that
there is no difference of truth that doesn't make a difference
of fact somewhere, and it seeks to determine the meaning of
all differences of opinion by making the discussion hinge as
303See, e.g., Z. CHAFEE, FREEDoM OF SPEECH 46-106, 120-60 (1920) (discussion of Espio-
nage Act cases).
304 Nagel, supra note 102, at 304-05, 334-39.
3*5 H. COMMAGER, FREEDOM, LOYALTY, DisSENT (1954).
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soon as possible upon some practical or particular issue.306
Although pragmatism may not justify the search for truth, or even
define truth, the purpose of the methodology is to discover norma-
tive values. It is, nevertheless, methodology that is important to
the pragmatist. Facts, consequences, experience- these are what
the work of the pragmatist is all about. Commager made this clear
in his approving quotation of a comment by Ben Franklin: "We
are, I think, in the right Road of Improvement, for we are making
Experiments. I do not oppose all that seem wrong, for the Multi-
tude are more effectually set right by Experience, than kept from
going wrong by Reasoning with them. '30 7 Professor Berns, whose
style might best be characterized as curmudgeonly, has taken issue
with both libertarian and pragmatic approaches. The libertarians,
in his view, too often confuse liberty with license and refuse to
consider the concomitant responsibilities of liberty.30 8 The "mar-
ketplace of ideas," on the other hand, was a formula for unthinking
cacophony, because it made no provision for experience:
With no clear idea of the good, beyond democracy as freedom
and equality, and adamantly denying that any agency of gov-
ernment may interest itself in the determination of what is
right, they must perforce allow this to be determined by the
people as a whole, by public opinion. And the process by
which this opinion is formed is, to repeat, no concern of the
law, just as the opinion itself may not be tested by moral
principle. Democracy is government by public opinion, which
can be anything so long as it is freely formed. This is the
ideal. The end of government for these liberals is a certain
process. The end is government by the people-not even nec-
essarily of and for the people.309
If the pragmatist methodology, however, follows the line of Com-
mager in the search for truth, some of Berns' concerns may be
ameliorated. Nevertheless, I do not want to restate the libertarian/
utilitarian/pragmatist debate. I only wish to note that the values
306 Id. at 12-13.
307 Id. at 48 (quoting a letter from Franklin to Jonathan Shipley in 1786).
308 W. BERNS, FREEDOM, VIRTUE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 26 (1957)
309 Id. at 170-71.
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assumed and the methodology employed can have a significant ef-
fect on the constitutional protection accorded to speech. In 1930,
thanks to the work of Holmes, Brandeis, and Hughes (no doubt
prodded by other judges and scholars), the Court had begun at last
to place speech in the constellation of important constitutional val-
ues because of its role in developing and maintaining the process
and structure of democracy. The Court's approach may have been
somewhat ad hoc, but the problems had begun to grow into some
principles.
I
